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INTRODUCTION
On Friday, June 26, 1987, Lewis Powell announced his resignation
from the Supreme Court of the United States.' Five days later, President
Reagan announced his intention to nominate United States Court of Ap-
peals Judge Robert H. Bork to fill the vacancy. 2 The nomination set the
scene for the most heated and prolonged campaign for a Supreme Court
vacancy in recent history. When the smoke cleared from the battle-
ground of the Senate Caucus Room of the Russell Senate Office Building,
nearly four months after President Reagan's ringing endorsement, the
Senate had rejected Judge Bork's nomination. The fierce, politically-
charged battle captured the attention of the American public.
Senator Edward Kennedy set the tone of the debate in a nationally
televised statement that warned of the disastrous implications of a Bork
confirmation: "Robert Bork's America is a land in which women would
be forced into back-alley abortions, blacks would sit at segregated lunch
counters [and] rogue police could break down citizens' doors in midnight
raids... ." -3 Interlocutors waged much of the ensuing struggle on ideo-
logical turf, characterizing Judge Bork's judicial philosophy as either
flowing with or sailing against the values of the American mainstream.
Judge Bork attempted to situate himself between both ideological camps
and instead characterized his philosophy as "neither liberal nor con-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida School of Law. I would like to thank
Derek Spilman for his comments on an earlier draft.
1. Taylor, Powell Leaves High Cour4" Took Key Role on Abortion and on Affirmative Action,
N.Y. Times, June 27, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
2. Boyd, Bork Picked for High Courp Reagan Cites His "Restraint" Confirmation Fight
Looms, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1987, at Al, col. 6.
3. 133 CONG. REC. S9188 (daily ed. July 1, 1987) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy).
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servative [but] simply a philosophy of judging which gives the Constitu-
tion a full and fair interpretation but, where the Constitution is silent,
leaves the policy struggles to the Congress, the President, the legislatures
and executives of the 50 states, and to the American people" (p. 300;
footnote omitted).
These protestations of neutrality did not shield Judge Bork from the
probing inquiries of Senators who questioned whether his interpretation
of the Constitution was, in the final assessment, a full and fair one. Judge
Bork's first principle of judicial philosophy is that "[tihe judge's author-
ity [must] deriv[e] entirely from the fact that he is applying the law and
not his personal values" (p. 300). But could Bork be seduced by the very
temptations against which he so avidly counseled resistance? In other
words, was his judicial philosophy of original understanding no more
than an artifice for imposing his own political vision on 20th century
America? Did he first "locate" that vision in the common understand-
ings of 18th and 19th century Framers and then simply contend that
because the vision was not his own, his decisions were laudable examples
of judges applying rather than making law? The doubts raised about
Bork's approach to judging, and its ramifications in American society,
doomed his nomination to the United States Supreme Court.
With The Tempting of America, Robert Bork answers the criticisms
his judicial philosophy raised during this heated campaign. This Essay
summarizes and critiques his response in three parts. Part I provides an
overview of the book and conveys a sense of its tone and central themes,
with primary attention given to Bork's theoretical point of departure, the
Madisonian dilemma. I outline the major points of his argument by situ-
ating his judicial philosophy of original understanding within this theo-
retical framework, elucidating how and why Bork believes his philosophy
provides the only plausible solution to the Madisonian dilemma.
Part II argues that Bork's philosophy collapses under the weight of
its own demanding standards and is unduly overinclusive and underin-
clusive. That is, given the central premise-that judges must decide
cases by reference to the common understanding of constitutional and
statutory texts at the time those texts were framed by the authors-the
theory cannot coherently explain why the results reached in certain cases
are acceptable and others unacceptable. This internal critique explains
how Bork's jurisprudence does not and cannot satisfy its own goals. In
Part III, I discuss how the problems with Bork's analysis are related to a
larger dilemma explored in the current debates in legal hermeneutics,
primarily whether an interpreter of a text can ever discover as opposed to
produce meaning in her engagement with that text. This external cri-
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tique exposes the hermeneutic problem at the core of Bork's theory-and
any theory that seeks to declare definitively what the Constitution means.
Finally, Parts IV and V briefly outline a partial response to the di-
lemma created by the need to limit judicial discretion-the concern that
ostensibly motivates Bork's judicial philosophy of original understand-
ing-and the insight that judicial interpretation of the text is necessarily
an exercise in the production of meaning. I suggest an alternative ap-
proach to judicial interpretation, one that respects the text and historical
context of the Constitution, but also incorporates the points raised by
noninterpretivist and deconstructionist critics of interpretivism. I use
this alternative to critique Bork's idea of the "color-blind Constitution"
and to present a different approach to the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fif-
teenth amendments, one that takes into account the history of the people
whom the Reconstruction Amendments were intended to help4Tm (Amendmen9ifT
BTn3 Tr /F5 1 Tf 
11.3 0 0 11 382475.4 Tm (wh62.ents )TjT
BTnT
3 Tr /F5 1 Tf 
11.3 0 0 11 069 592.3 Tm (j43Tj
11. 0./F6 1 Tf 
1193 0 0 11 069 540.5 Tm (Re3Tj
11. OVERVIEW3 Tr /F5 1 Tf 
11.4 0 0 11 38 527.8 Tm (th17's )Tj
11.0 0 11 88 592.3 Tm 6th17's )Tjpass.3 1.71 0 0 11 193 540.5 Tm45th17's )Tjionri5 0 0 11 136 592.3 Tm8(th17's )Tj1.9 0 0 11 260 488.6 Tm 7th17's )Tj1 0 0 11 249 514.8 Tm21th17's fh17's ih17's pe17's 
t39t 
221 o221 5t221 
dm08Tj
3 Twhi8 0 0 11 357 527.8 Tm48dm08Tj
3 Tideolog
BT
0 0 11 30 501.8 Tmm 2w208Tj
3 T
11.st 0 0 11 101 579.4 Tm (F208Tj
3 Tfor0 0 11 344 488.6 Tm (t208Tj
3 T
11rol0 0 11 218 514.8 T297Tm08Tj
3 T7 0 0 11 325 488.6 Tm1(t208Tj
3 T.5 0 0 11 360 618. Tm 29t208Tj
3 Tn")Tj
E
3 Tr /F5 1 Tf 
11.5 0 0 11 38 488.6 Tm 7m195)Tj
11 .8 0 0 11 166 605.3 T (t195)Tj
11.7 0 0 11 83 579.4 Tm (t195)Tj
110. 0 0 11 280 631.9 T99t195)Tj
11cd195
s195
s195
Fi182 p182 824
10.Wade/F6 1 Tf 
1175 0 0 116.76 605.6.76  5t173824
10.4/F6 1 Tf 
11.4 0 0 11 73 553.9 Tm (tm (824
10.a3 0 0 11 25 566.6 Tm 1tm (824
10.relevan 0 0 11 76 540.5 Tmm31t1 (824
10.4 0 0 11 220 488.6 T144t1 (824
10.4.0 0 11 1414 605.3 Tm (Bm (824
10.resolu1.8 0 0 11 261 579.4 Tm1(Bm (824
10.7 0 0 11 231 514.8 Tm24t1 (824
10.4.0 0 11 1414 488.6 Tm4(Bm (824
10.abor1. 0 0 11 340 631.9 T284t1 (824
10.iss6 0 0 11 645 488.6 Tm1(t1 (824
10.is 0 11 1414 605.3 Tm2 T1 (824
10.1 
1t
BT
0 0 11 133 488.6 Tm 7cm (824
10.a3 Tr /F5 1 Tf 
11.4 0 0 11 38475.4 Tm (w156 )Tj
1den.5 0 0 11 24 501.8 Tm (j156 )Tj
11.2 0 0 11 17 618. Tm 90T156 )Tj
1judge 0 0 11 58 514.8 Tm124t156 )Tj
1a3 0 0 11 253 618. Tm (2t156 )Tj
1bouT
0 0 11Tf 
11. 0 0 11 3108 644.4 Tm 4t156 )Tj
1r /F5 1 Tf 
11.7 0 0 11 357 527.8 Tm90T156 )Tj
1law 0 11 1412 618. Tm2 (t156 )Tj
1(pp
0 0 11 357 631.9 Tm 2t156 )Tj
13-4)
3 Tr /F5 1 Tf 
11.3 0 0 11 607 631.9 T59m (2's )TjT2 0 0 11 311 579.4 T 1m (2's )Tjpopulariz11.8 0 0 11 164 475.4 T152m (2's )Tjj 0 0 11 282 644.4 Tm 5t1(2's )Tj )2 0 0 11 108 605.3 Tm86a1(2's )Tjview0 0 11 414 605.3 Tm11m (2's )TjpTj
17 0 0 11 277 540.5 Tm57t1(2's )Tj )0 0 11 1414 605.3 Tm 6a1(2's )Tj
11.7er0 0 11 294 475.4 Tm (i (2's )Tjj 0 0 11 286 475.4 Tm25t1(2's )TjTn0 0 11 109 514.8 Tm40t1(2's )Tjun
1
3 Tr /F5 1 Tf 
11.4 0 0 11 38 553.9 Tm 7T129)Tj
11.rol1e 0 0 11 309 514.8 T71T129)Tj
11j
11.52 0 0 11 90 631.9 Tmm 7T129)Tj
11..2 0 0 11 174 488.6 Tm40t129)Tj
11ma 0 0 11 888 605.3 Tm64i129)Tj
11usurp0 0 11 220 488.6 T194T129)Tj
11.. 0 0 11 357 527.8 T213T129)Tj
11ver 0 0 11 880 488.6 Tm37T129)Tj
11r2.2 s0 0 11 154 488.6 Tm 8T129)Tj
11i 0 0 11 192 527.8 Tm 9T129)Tj
11iT0 0 11 30 501.8 Tmm91T129)Tj
11swor 0 0 11 164 475.4 T323T129
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Quoting Justice Story, Bork contends that "[t]he first and fundamental
rule in the interpretation of all instruments is, to construe them accord-
ing to the sense of the terms, and the intention of the parties."5  Bork
concludes that "[o]nly by following that rule can our unelected guardians
save us from themselves. Only in that way can the foundation of our
freedoms, the separation of powers, be kept intact. Only so can judicial
supremacy be democratically legitimate" (p. 6). With regard to the di-
chotomy between law and politics, the bottom line for judges engaged in
constitutional interpretation is that they must "demonstrate that [they]
began from recognized legal principles and reasoned in an intellectually
coherent and politically neutral way to [their] result" (p. 2).
When judges fail to act in this politically neutral fashion, they en-
gage in what Bork refers to as constitutional "revisionism" (p. 15), the
process of rewriting the Constitution by deciding cases in accordance
with their own values, rather than those embodied in the Constitution.
Part one of his book traces some of the most obvious revisions of the
Constitution, identifies the social values the revisions served and evalu-
ates the justifications offered in their support. Bork attempts to establish
the legitimacy of his own judicial philosophy by criticizing both liberal
and conservative judges who have strayed improperly from the standard
of neutrality:
The Supreme Court that struck down economic regulation designed to
protect workers is, judged as a judicial body, indistinguishable from
the Court that struck down abortion laws. Neither Court gave any-
thing resembling an adequate reason derived from the Constitution for
frustrating the democratic outcome. So far as one can tell from the
opinions written, each Court denied majority morality for no better
reason than that elite opinion ran the other way. [p. 17]
In part three of his book, Bork turns from a discussion of constitu-
tional history and theory to examine the nomination, hearings, and
charges made against him. He responds in cursory fashion to the charges
that confirmation meant a vote against the civil rights of racial minorities
(p. 324) and women (p. 326); for government, except when it opposed big
business; against small business and labor (p. 331); and against freedom
of speech under the first amendment (p. 333).
By responding to these charges, although not in great depth, Bork
attempts to "demonstrate that key charges were not only false but should
have been, must have been, known to be false by the individuals and
groups that made them and repeated them even after they were answered
5. P. 6 (quoting . STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSrITUTION OF THE UNrrED STATES
at vi (R. Rotunda & J. Nowak rev. ed. 1987) (1833)) (footnote omitted).
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with facts."'6 According to Bork, the techniques used in the campaign
against him provide further proof of "the way the war for control of our
legal culture is being fought" (p. 336), and how certain factions have
politicized the law and threatened the future of our constitutional system
of government.
The most interesting dimension of the work and by far the most
significant for constitutional theory is part two. Simply entitled "The
Theorists," this part begins with a description of the Madisonian di-
lemma and then moves to a discussion of how various constitutional the-
orists have attempted to resolve the conflict. Bork contrasts the "clear,
to the point, self-confident, and accessible to the nonprofessional reader"
theory of original understanding to the more "abstruse," "philosophi-
cal," "convoluted" and "complex style" of contemporary constitutional
theorists (p. 134). The latter, in his estimation, is a style, as Justice Story
put it, addressed not "'to the common sense of the people' but.., to a
specialized and sophisticated clerisy of judicial power."' 7 It is principally
this clerisy whose "enterprise involves nothing less than the subversion of
the law's foundations" (p. 136).
Rather than analyze the strengths and weaknesses of Bork's treat-
ment of liberal and conservative constitutional revisionism (pp. 187-240)
and his response to the critiques of original understanding (pp. 161-85), I
explore his judicial philosophy in greater detail and-given its presup-
positions and aspirations- critique its internal coherency and practical-
ity. Examining Bork's theory on its own terms, this critique exposes the
extent to which the theory falls short of the standards of neutrality it
articulates as the sine qua non of legitimate constitutional interpretation.
Specifically, I use Bork's adoption of the concept of the "color-blind
Constitution" as an example of how the "neutral principles" he derives
are, in reality, political choices about how to interpret the Constitution.
It is the choice of this "neutral principle" in particular that I critique in
Part IV and to which I present an alternative in Part V.8
II. A CRITIQUE
A. The Madisonian Dilemma and the Original Understanding
Like all constitutional theorists, Bork's point of departure for inter-
preting the Constitution is the Madisonian dilemma. Generally speak-
6. P. 336. Bork never details, however, how these charges "should have been, must have been,
known to be false" (p. 336). He simply recounts his positions as obviously and irrefutably correct
(pp. 323-36).
7. P. 134 (quoting J. STORY, supra note 5, at vi).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 76-98.
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ing, the Madisonian dilemma underscores the difficulty of balancing the
principle of minority rights with that of majority rule. More specifically,
it poses the dilemma in liberalism of how to justify the
countermajoritarian power of courts to declare the acts of democratic
bodies unconstitutional.9 If the power to govern is left in the hands of
the people themselves, what need is there for a "higher" authority to rule
on the actions of the majority?
The transition from medievalism to liberalism embodied a skepti-
cism about the power of human reason to deduce laws that reflected the
common good from the universal and immutable principles of God or
Nature. If the common good was not some intelligible essence waiting to
be discovered by the high priests of religion and law, officials could only
know the "good" by reference to the aggregated subjective desires of
those who comprise the community. The articulation of market and
political institutions-premised on the pursuit of individual self-inter-
est-supported and promoted epistemological skepticism as to the exist-
ence of a common good that was independent of the aggregation of
individual desires.10
Liberalism's epistemological skepticism raises an interesting di-
lemma, however, with respect to the legitimacy of majoritarian govern-
ance. If there is no teleology of values and desires by which the interests
of some can be preferred to others, then by what authority does even a
majority subjugate the subjective needs of the minority? One reply to
this question builds on what some perceive to be the nature of pluralism.
Pluralism suggests that individuals' conception of their self-interest is not
static. Because individuals organize into a multiplicity of groups with
varying agendas, majorities born of the processes of negotiation and com-
promise also are not static. The idea of shifting majorities suggests that
there are no permanent losers and that majority rule is thus compatible
with liberalism's individualist conception of the good. The individual
can defer to majority rule because her subjective conception of the good
is either ever-changing or multidimensional. In the game of give and
take, she wins some and loses others, and finds this outcome preferable to
the Hobbesian alternative of a state of perpetual war" in which she
stands to lose all. Thus, deference to majority rule is compatible with the
idea of an individual who defers immediate gratification of a desire be-
9. See generally R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLMICS 88-100 (1984) (no coherent theory
of adjudication is possible within liberal political thought, thus the judge, in effect, subsumes the role
of the lawmaker instead of applying the law).
10. For a discussion of medieval thought and the role of intelligible essences, see id at 31-32.
11. See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 13 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1963) (1653).
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cause of an enlightened self-interest that values security over the uncer-
tain attainment of a subjective good.
A pluralist defense of liberalism is problematic for two reasons.
First, from the standpoint of liberalism's deontological presuppositions,
there is no validity to the argument that members of the minority may
someday subjugate the individual goods of members of the majority as
well. For example, we would not think permissible a legislative act that
confiscated private property for public use without just compensation
simply because the victims could seek revenge in the next legislative ses-
sion. Second, the assumption that there are no permanent minorities
may well be overstated. Perhaps some groups are insular, discrete, and
held in such contempt by majorities that they remain largely unprotected
by normal democratic processes. 12
Liberalism requires for its legitimation some assurance that the ma-
jority's present conception of the "good" will not be imposed on others,
that alternate notions of the good will be permitted to exist. Liberalism
offers constitutional democracy as an answer to the deficiencies of demo-
cratic pluralism. Ratification of the Constitution and recognition of the
lawmaking process that cloaks legislative pronouncements with the insti-
tutional legitimacy of law compensate the individual's acquiescence to
majority rule: Submission is granted in exchange for the maintenance of
this process and the protection of individual rights from the decisions of
majorities.
The judiciary stands between the majority and the minority, en-
trusted with the responsibility of protecting the rights of the latter from
the impermissible coercive acts of the former. Thus, a
countermajoritarian institution capable of invalidating the acts of majori-
ties is vital to the legitimacy of liberal democracy. The central question
then becomes how to check the power of unelected judges even as they
purport to check the powers of majorities. How are individuals to be
protected from an abuse of judicial power, the imposition of judges' con-
ception of the common good over that of the majority's? In other words,
how should judges be prevented from destroying the republican form of
government envisioned by the Framers in the name of protecting individ-
ual rights? These are the questions to which Bork contends that the judi-
cial philosophy of original understanding provides the best possible
answer.
12. See Justice Stone's discussion of "discrete and insular minorities" in United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) ("prejudice against discrete and insular minori-
ties may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspond-
ingly more searching judicial inquiry").
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DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Original understanding is a form of legal positivism. 1 3 The core of
underlying assumptions share a common denominator: The
countermajoritarian posture of the court is not inconsistent with the
principles of democracy when judges judge rather than will the results of
constitutional disputes-when, in other words, they act on neutral prin-
ciples. The neutral act of "judging" does not allow the judge to read into
the law her own conception of morality. According to Bork, the philoso-
phy of original understanding permits neutral adjudication because
judges are able to engage in a multi-step process of deriving, defining and
applying principles of law (p. 146).
First, judges who embrace original understanding as a judicial phi-
losophy can neutrally adjudicate constitutional disputes because they
neutrally derive the principles of law they apply: The judge "finds his
principle in the Constitution as originally understood" (p. 146). Judges
do not impose their own values, only those accepted by the public at the
time of ratification. The process of judging is different from the legisla-
tor's task of making law and the moralist's task of deciding policy values
by which to live in that subjective values and perspectives should not
influence the neutral decisionmaking processes of the judge.
Second, judges can neutrally define and apply the law because at
least some constitutional provisions have a definitive meaning. To dis-
cover that meaning, judges need only refer to the texts, convention de-
bates, public discussion, newspaper articles, and dictionaries in use at the
time of ratification (p. 144). The level of abstraction at which general
values like equality and liberty-to take two rather vague concepts found
in the Constitution-are to be applied should not depend upon value
choices made by the judges, but rather should be determined by the value
choices of the ratifiers (pp. 147-50).
Bork contends that the philosophy of original understanding is the
only way to respond adequately to the Madisonian dilemma. 14 We can
trust judges not to abuse their power as guardians of individual rights
when they understand and act on the premise that they are bound by the
law as much as those whose disputes they adjudicate. They must be
faithful to the original understanding of the clauses they interpret and
thereby resist the temptation to make rather than apply the law. It is this
central premise of Bork's philosophy of original understanding-that
13. See, ag., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 181-82 (1961) ("Here we shall take Legal
Positivism to mean the simple contention that it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce
or satisfy certain demands of morality, though in fact they have often done so.").
14. In fact, Bork entitles Chapter 12 of The Tempting of America, "The Impossibility of All
Theories that Depart from Original Understanding" (pp. 251-59).
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judges can neutrally derive, define, and apply the law-that the next Sec-
tion evaluates and critiques.
B. A Critique of Original Understanding
Rationality in the law is often measured by the degree to which the
means utilized to reach a permissible end fit that end.15 A great degree of
ill-fit (either the means underreaching or overreaching the end) raises
serious concerns about the reasonableness of those means and whether
they should be given constitutional approbation. This means-end analy-
sis is a useful analogy in evaluating Bork's judicial philosophy, especially
because much of his argument involves fourteenth amendment equal pro-
tection analysis.
There can be little question that Bork's end of articulating the
boundaries of judicial action is legitimate. Few of us would earnestly
contend that an unelected judiciary should have unfettered discretion to
say what the law is, even if we believe that such discretion, for all practi-
cal purposes, already exists. Even Bork admits that "[lt is of course true
that judges to some extent must make law every time they decide a case,"
but if done correctly, "it is only minor, interstitial lawmaking" (p. 5).
Along with Bork, we tenaciously cling to the distinction between good
and bad judging and the prerogative of criticizing certain judicial pro-
nouncements as "right" or "wrong." This assumes that there are, at
least in our own minds, rather clear boundaries that demarcate the legiti-
mate sphere of judicial activity.
The real source of the problem is the means Bork selects to imple-
ment his goal of articulating the parameters of adjudicative legitimacy-
a commitment to original understanding. If the end is to limit the poten-
tial abuse of judicial discretion, then Bork's use of original understanding
misses the mark: It validates cases its premises should invalidate (overin-
clusiveness) and invalidates those cases that its premises should validate
(underinclusiveness). Bork, however, hedges on the most important
point when he says that lawyers and judges should seek "the original
meaning of the words" even while he puts aside the "questions of breadth
of approach or of room for play in the joints" (p. 145). Bork refuses to
15. See Loving v. Virginia, 386 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (equal protection clause permits racial classifi-
cation only if it is necessary to accomplish a permissible state objective); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1987) (government regulation is justified if it furthers an important government
interest); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 547 (1977) (statutes that restrict liberty
must have an ascertainable purpose and provide a reasonable means to achieve that purpose); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (liberty may not be infringed upon by legislation that is
arbitrary or without a rationale relation to a state interest); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protec-
tion of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1944) (government's classification scheme must bear a
reasonable relation to the objectives of the law).
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deal with these crucial questions. And, in fact, Bork's method of deriv-
ing principles and "finding" their level of generality (p. 148) makes for
significant indeterminacy and exacerbates the potential for abuse of judi-
cial discretion.
1. Original Understanding and the Problem of Overinclusiveness.
Bork's discussion of Brown v. Board of Education 1 6 provides an illustra-
tion of his theory's overinclusiveness. According to Bork, the result in
Brown was correct, but the Court wrongly rejected reliance on the origi-
nal understanding of the fourteenth amendment in favor of amassed psy-
chological evidence on the harm of segregation (pp. 75-76). To reconcile
his contention that Brown was correctly decided with his judicial philos-
ophy of original understanding, Bork argues that judges are to interpret
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment by reference to
the original understanding of that clause, that is, what "the public of that
time would have understood" the word "equality" to mean (p. 144).
This argument assumes, however, that only one clear, definitive meaning
of that term existed. At least one historian has questioned whether lan-
guage like "equality" and "liberty" had any fixed meaning around the
time of ratification.1 7 Furthermore, the society of that time also saw little
inconsistency between the norm of constitutional equality and state im-
posed segregation of the races.1 8 Indeed, the pronouncement in Plessy v.
Ferguson 19 of the "separate but equal" doctrine was little more than the
16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
17. See W. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMmNDMENT: FROM PoLmcAL PRINCIPLE TO JU-
DICIAL DocruNE 21 (1988). William Nelson argues that:
The concept of equality, in short, had quite different meanings for different groups in the
antislavery movement. Indeed, the concept of equality had an even larger number of mean-
ings for different groups in mid-nineteenth-century American society at large. Some of
these meanings, moreover, were not consistent with each other. To some mid-nineteenth-
century Americans equality had reference only to political rights. To others, in contrast,
the concept had reference to economic power and social place; to some of these others,
equality was associated with an old antimonopoly tradition. To Southerners, the concept
of equality was a weapon for use in the defense of slavery, whereas for advocates of anti-
slavery in the North it was the principal bulwark of their movement. To some within the
antislavery movement, blacks would gain only legal rights once they received the equal
protection of the laws. But to others, equal protection would bring in its wake political,
economic, and ultimately social equality.
Equality was thus a vague, perhaps even an empty idea in mid-nineteenth-century
America. But it was the very emptiness and vagueness of the concept that made it so
useful and popular. Equality could mean almost anything, and hence it could be used by
almost any group in antebellum America to defend almost any position. The use of more
precise arguments in support of a political program might tend to drive off potential sup-
port, but no one could be driven away by an argument for equality, since everyone believed
in it.
Id (footnote omitted).
18. See Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REv, 1,
59-65 (1955).
19. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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legal enshrinement of a widely-held assumption that legal separation was
quite compatible with constitutional equality.20 To rely on original
meanings would appear to commit Bork to a Plessy-like account of
equality.
Bork acknowledges this problem and simply concludes that the
Framers and ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment had it wrong: Legal
separation of the races could not be equal and Brown's acknowledgement
of that fact was long overdue. Bork, however, decries the Court's reli-
ance on psychological data (p. 75). In his view, the Court would have
stood on more legitimate ground had it simply given primacy to the lan-
guage of equality found in the Constitution, rather than looking outside
the text for substantiation of its position.
It is difficult to see, however, how the Court could have depended
exclusively on the language of the text, given its own precedent and the
original understanding of the word "equality." Under either Bork's ap-
proach or that of the Brown Court, the Justices would have been com-
pelled to conclude that the Framers and subsequent interpreters had it
wrong. Both approaches constitute a revolution in the interpretation of
the concept of "equality."
Given that original understanding may be insufficient, and that one
can conclude that the Framers and ratifiers may simply have had it
wrong, it is fair to ask how judges will read the Constitution to gain a
more accurate interpretation. Bork makes clear that the values selected
can be neither the subjective values of the judge nor community values
that reflect societal changes in racial relations because such assessments
take the judge outside the permissible boundaries of interpreting the
Constitution. But how else is one to find its meaning?
Bork seems to believe that words such as "equality" possess a hid-
den meaning that eluded the Framers and ratiflers, as well as the Plessy
Court-a meaning finally and accurately discovered by the Brown Court.
Hidden meanings are always problematic, however, because we never
know if the "found" meaning is the real one or just another aberration.
The enterprise of original understanding cannot be at all determinative of
what judges should and should not decide when the clauses and concepts
they would interpret are susceptible to such varying interpretations, each
claiming that it has unlocked the true meaning of the clause. If the
Framers were wrong about legal separation being compatible with consti-
tutional equality, what else have we read wrongly? We could be wrong,
for instance, about our insistence on discriminatory purpose rather than
discriminatory impact being conclusive of an equal, protection viola-
20. See id at 544-49; see also W. NELSON, supra note 17, at 185-87.
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tion.21 To the extent that discriminatory purpose is viewed as consistent
with the original understanding, it is possible that the Framers and ra-
tifiers simply had it wrong once again.
Some commentators have argued that strict adherence to Bork's
original understanding doctrine would require a reversal of much estab-
lished precedent, including the Legal Tender Cases22 and much of this
century's New Deal jurisprudence.23 In an attempt to deflect these criti-
cisms, Bork acknowledges that it may be too late in the constitutional
day to retrieve a purely interpretivist Constitution.24 This acknowledge-
ment requires Bork to explain the role of precedent in his theory.
According to Bork's theory, even if a judge is faced with a precedent
that was wrongly decided-from an originalist perspective--he must
proceed cautiously. The judge must first determine whether the errone-
ous ruling has become so embedded in the fabric of our nation and in the
expectations of individual behavior that the inertial mass of societal reli-
ance and the need for certainty in the law preclude reversal. "There are
times when we cannot recover the transgressions of the past, when the
best we can do is say to the Court, 'Go and sin no more" (p. 159). But
Bork's theory, when understood in this fashion, provides no guidance in
a Brown-like situation. Judges may reasonably disagree not only on
whether the Framers' interpretation was wrong, but also on whether the
interpretation has altered so substantially the expectations and reliance
of the society that it would be imprudent to overrule prior decisions.
Bork also notes that in the neutral application of principle, the judge
must consider the impact of technological change or evolutions in the
dynamics of the legal environment on the constitutional principle at issue
(pp. 168-69). Such assessments may well lead originalist judges to apply
an old principle according to a new understanding of a social situation:
A judge who refuses to see new threats to an established constitutional
value, and hence provides a crabbed interpretation that robs a provi-
sion of its full, fair, and reasonable meaning, fails in his judicial duty.
That duty... is to ensure that the powers and freedoms the founders
specified are made effective in today's altered world. The evolution of
21. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (requiring a showing of discriminatory
purpose to establish the unconstitutionality of a facially race-neutral hiring practice alleged to have a
discriminatory impact against blacks).
22. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 545 (1871) (allowing Congress to issue treasury notes and to make
them legal tender in satisfaction of antecedent debts). By rejecting the argument that the Framers
intended the issue of metallic money and not paper money, the Court, in effect, adopted a more
flexible approach than what appeared to be the original understanding.
23. See Bittker, The Bicentennial of the Jurisprudence of Original Intent. The Recent Past, 77
CALF. L. REv. 235, 278-82 (1989).
24. Pp. 159-60. In fact, Bork can point to no one on the Supreme Court from John Marshall to
William Rehnquist, liberal or conservative, who has ever interpreted the Constitution correctly.
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doctrine to accomplish that end contravenes no postulate of judicial
restraint. [p. 149]
Bork maintains that there is a difference between an "evolution of
doctrine to maintain the vigor of an existing principle" and the "creation
of new constitutional principles" (p. 169). In his view, Olman v. Ev-
ans 25 and New York Times v. Sullivan 26 correctly took account of the
evolution of the relationship between libel law and the first amendment.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 27 on the other hand, was "not an adjustment of
an old principle to a new reality but the creation of a new principle by
tour de force or, less politely, by sleight of hand" (p. 169). Bork admits
that "there is a spectrum along which the adjustments of doctrine to take
account of new social, technological, and legal developments may'gradu-
ally become so great as to amount to the creation of a new principle" (p.
169), but these are the decisions that the judge must make along the slip-
pery slope. However, as a result of this judicious weighing of societal
reliance, as well as technological and institutional change, the Borkian
interpretivist makes what are essentially political and policy decisions-
the very type of decisions for which Bork criticizes those he calls "revi-
sionists" (pp. 16-18; 130-36). In essence, the Borkian judge finds that the
attempt to "apply old values to new circumstances" inevitably mires her
in political choices and dissolves the illusory distinctions between law
and politics.
2. Original Understanding and the Problem of Underinclusiveness.
In contrast to his reading of Brown, Bork characterizes the Supreme
Court decision in Shelley v. Kraemer2s as "a political decision" that
"should have been made by a legislature" (p. 153)-a "nonneutral appli-
cation of principle in the service of a good cause" (p. 151). His analysis
of this case illustrates the underinclusiveness of his theory. Accepting for
the moment the central tenets of his judicial philosophy, I see no reason
why the case's holding cannot be viewed as the explication of a neutral
principle amenable to future neutral application.
The case involved whites who had signed agreements--racially re-
strictive covenants-promising not to sell their homes to nonwhites. De-
spite the covenants, some whites sold to blacks and the other property
25. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane) (Bork, J., concurring) (holding that statements set
forth in an opinion page of a newspaper are constitutionally protected expressions, and hence not
actionable in a defamation claim).
26. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that a non-commercial advertisement allegedly defaming a
public official was entitled to constitutional protection unless the statement is made with "actual
malice").
27. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
28. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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owners brought suit to enforce the covenants. The state court enforced
the covenant and enjoined the blacks from taking possession. In the
Supreme Court, the black petitioners argued that the enforcement of ra-
cially restrictive covenants deprived them of their equal protection rights
under the fourteenth amendment. The problem was that the Constitu-
tion only restricts action by the state, not private individuals. 29 Thus,
the issue was whether there was the requisite state action needed to in-
yoke the protection of the amendment.
Bork contends that the answer is clearly no, and that the Shelley
principle, which allows a court to find state action in purely private acts,
was not derived neutrally. He notes that "[t]he problem for the Supreme
Court was that the Constitution restricts only action by the state, not
actions by private individuals" (p. 151). In this case, "state courts were
not the source of the racial discrimination, they merely enforced private
agreements according to the terms of those agreements" (pp. 151-52).
Therefore, the courts acted neutrally: "The racial discrimination in-
volved was not the policy of the state courts but the desire of private
individuals, which the courts enforced pursuant to normal, and neutral,
rules of enforcing private agreements" (p. 152). In Bork's view, to ex-
tend the reach of the anti-discrimination principle embodied in the four-
teenth amendment to private parties conflicts with "the ratifiers'
definition of the appropriate ranges of majority and minority freedom"
(p. 146).
According to Bork, the Shelley principle was not neutrally derived,
nor can it be neutrally applied, which largely accounts for why courts
have refused to extend it beyond the original case. To illustrate the prob-
lem of neutral application, Bork provides a hypothetical. He contends
that there is no distinction between the state action found in Shelley and
state enforcement of trespass laws at the request of a private property
owner to remove from his household a guest who becomes abusive with
regard to political issues the property owner deems offensive. Bork con-
tends that the rule of Shelley, applied neutrally, would preclude enforce-
ment of trespass laws in the latter instance because the guest's free speech
rights would be subjected to impermissible state interference (pp.
151-52).
Bork fails to recognize two important distinctions between Shelley
and his hypothetical that may satisfy his demand for neutral principles.
First, it is not merely the fact of state enforcement of private discrimina-
tion that created state action, but the fact that, with the exception of
racially restrictive covenants, state common and statutory law tradition-
29. Id. at 19.
1176 [Vol. 1990:1163
TEMPTATION AND FALL
ally had disfavored restrictive covenants that imposed restraints on the
alienability of property.30 The lack of consistency in the treatment of
such covenants means that the state court's enforcement of racially re-
strictive covenants violated Bork's own standard of neutral application of
principle.
Second, state enforcement of the covenants in Shelley would have
necessitated the employment of the coercive power of the state to force a
party not wishing to discriminate on the basis of race to do so-a prac-
tice that runs counter to the notion that the fourteenth amendment de-
mands state neutrality on the issue of race.3 1 By contrast, the narrow-
minded property owner in Bork's hypothetical is not compelled by the
state to engage in racially discriminatory activity.32
Furthermore, Bork's argument by analogy to the first amendment
context rings false because far more state limitations are permitted in the
first amendment right to free speech context than are permitted in dis-
criminatory acts that involve racial classifications. For instance, the state
may impose time, place, and manner restrictions on first amendment-
protected speech.33 To extend Bork's analogy, we might view the state
common law rules that give primacy to state trespass laws over the
guest's political speech as a common law time, place, and manner restric-
tion that raises no compelling constitutional objections. Thus, unlike the
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants, the state court's enforce-
ment of state trespass laws would not violate Bork's principle of
neutrality.
As we found when examining the overinclusiveness of original un-
derstanding, we can only understand its underinclusiveness as the result
of the judge's political choices about, for example, the definition and lim-
its of state action. The judge must choose, determine for herself, where
30. See L. Tasmi, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 260 (1985) C'Mhe issue is... whether a state
may choose automatically to enforce restrictive covenants that discriminate against blacks while gen-
erally regarding alienability restraints as anathema.").
31. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (holding that the exclu-
sion of black patrons from a privately-owned restaurant operating in a building leased from the State
of Delaware was discriminatory state action; the failure of the state to require the restaurant owner
to serve all persons "made itself a party to the refusal of service"); see also Nixon v. Herndon, 273
U.S. 536 (1927) (statute barring blacks from voting in primary elections was direct and obvious
violation of the fourteenth amendment).
32. See G. STONE, L. SEmMAN, C. SuNsTrEN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTrrruTIONAL LAW 1497-
99 (1986) [hereinafter G. STONE].
33. See ag., Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (high-school student's
use of explicit sexual metaphors in student election speech held during school hours was not pro-
tected by the first amendment); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (up-
holding zoning ordinance characterized as a "time, place, and manner regulation," which restricted
the locations of adult theatres); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 72-73 (1976)
(same).
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the line between state and private action is drawn in each case. And each
judge brings to each case presumptions and assumptions about where to
draw the line.34
Bork's search for neutral principles, "how the words used in the
Constitution would have been understood at the time" (p. 144), is mis-
guided. He confuses the discovery of someone else's meaning with the
production of his own. Thus, the question of "breadth of approach or of
room for play in the joints" (p. 145) that he wishes to put aside ulti-
mately corrupts his theory and blurs, if not obliterates, the line he draws
between law and politics. In the following Part, I situate Bork's interpre-
tivist project of original understanding within the broader debate of legal
hermeneutics and suggest why the search for neutral principles, at least
as he defines them, is an exercise in futility.
III. ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING AND PRODUCTION OF MEANING:
THE POSSIBILITY OF LEGAL HERMENEUTICS
Hermeneutics is the philosophical inquiry into processes of under-
standing and interpretation. 35 Because the judicial philosophy of original
understanding posits a theory of understanding and interpretation, it is a
hermeneutical theory of law and participates in this broader philosophi-
cal tradition. The question I want to pursue here is whether such theo-
ries permit us, as Bork claims, to discover meaning and thereby restrain
judges from engaging in policymaking, or whether such theories are
processes through which we produce meaning and thus require the judge
to be the policy-maker Bork so dreadfuily fears. 3 6
34. Bork does not escape this phenomenon either. He makes a step toward acknowledging this
reality in his analysis of the first amendment, when he admits that:
The Constitution states its principles in majestic generalities that we know cannot be taken
as sweepingly as the words might suggest.... [No one has ever supposed that Congress
could not make some speech unlawful or that it could not make all speech illegal in certain
places, at certain times, and under certain circumstances. [p. 147]
35. For general sources on philosophical, literary, and legal hermeneutics, see D. HoY, THE
CRmICAL CIRCLE: LITERATURE, HISTORY, AND PHILoSoPHICAL HERMENEUTICs (1978); THE
HERMENEUTICS READER: TExTs OF THE GERMAN TRADITION FROM THE ENLIGHTENMENT TO
THE PRESENT (K. Mueller-Vollmer ed. 1985); INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERME-
NEU.TiC READER (S. Levinson & S. Mailloux eds, 1988); Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, in THE
POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 249 (W. Mitchell ed. 1983); Hermann, Phenomenology, Structural-
isa, Henneneutic.; and Legal Study: Applications of Contemporary Continental Thought to Legal
Phenomena, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 379 (1982); Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and
Poststructuralist Perspectives 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 135 (1985) [hereinafter Hoy, Interpreting the Law];
McIntosh, LegalHerneneutic" 4 Philosophical Critique, 35 OLA. L. REv. 1 (1982); White, Law as
Language" Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEx. L. REv. 415 (1982).
36. At least since Descartes' attempt to provide philosophy with a solid scientific foundation,
philosophers have posed central epistemological and metaphysical questions about the basis of
knowledge and the nature of being. Descartes' grand proclamation, "I think, therefore I am," predi-
cated "being" on "understanding." That is, through objective and scientific methods of inquiry, the
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Although I do not intend to provide a detailed survey of legal her-
meneutics, certain observations might assist in assessing the nature of
Bork's contribution to the themes this tradition addresses. For purposes
of convenience, I categorize the interlocutors into three groups: interpre-
tivists, noninterpretivists, and deconstructionists (a group that stands
outside the formal debate and critiques the other two approaches). 37 As
I will make clear, the distinctions among these groups at times blur, if
not disappear, making the differences often seem more a matter of degree
observer could understand the nature of being and grasp the fundamental truths about the human
condition. See R. DESCARTES, Discourse On Method (1637), in I THE PHLosoPHCAL WoRKS OF
DEscARTEs 101 (E. Haldane & G. Ross trans. 1973).
The belief that science consisted of applying objective laws of nature fell into disfavor, however,
and what observers once believed to be universal, neutral, and objective laws of nature were seen as
conventions chosen from among the various ways of describing the world. See R. BaRNsrErN, BE-
YOND OBECTInsm AND RELATIVISM: ScrE~cE, HERm TNEtmcs, AND PRAXLs 22-25 (1983); T.
KUHN, THE STRucTURE OF ScmNTiFIc REVOLUTONS (2d ed. 1970). This critique of natural sci-
ence methodologies has had far-reaching implications for human and social sciences such as philoso-
phy and law, not the least of which has been the development of different ways of knowing the world
that compete with the formerly privileged scientific narratives.
Hermeneutics is one method that deprivileges the methodologies of natural science and con-
tends that there are different ways of knowing the world. The hermeneutics of Martin Heidegger,
for instance, turned on its head the philosophical tradition initiated by Descartes and enshrined by
Kant. "Being' is not just "understanding," claimed Heidegger, understanding also is being. Thus,
our understanding of the world can never fully escape our context, the historicity of our being in the
world. That is, we are thrown into a world that shapes and preconditions our understanding of that
world. Therefore, the classical dichotomies between subject and object, reason and value, the inter-
preter and the text are illusory and misleading. The interpreter's understanding of the text always is
preconditioned by the preunderstandings she brings to the interpretive act See M. HEmEGGER,
BEING AND TIME 32-33 (J. Macquartie & E. Robinson trans. 1962). As one scholar of hermeneutics
has put it:
[A] fundamental hermeneutical tenet is that there is no such thing as the "text-in-itself,"
independent of any particular reading or interpretation. As a result, hermeneutics does not
have the same problem as epistemology with the question whether there are mind-in-
dependent "things-in-themselves." A text only comes to be in a reading, that is, in an act
of understanding and interpretation.
Hoy, Interpreting the Law, supra note 35, at 143.
The various hermeneutical theories of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jacques Derrida, and Paul de
Man drawn upon in this Essay have evolved from these basic insights into the way we understand
and interpret the world. For a general discussion, see Weisberg, Text Into Theory: A Literary Ap-
proach to the Constitution, 22 GA. L. REV. 939 (1986).
37. The interpretivist/noninterpretivists dichotomy can be traced to the work of John Hart Ely
in J. ELY, DnMocRAc' Am DiSRrusT 1 (1980) ("[We are likely to call the contending sides 'inter-
pretivism' and 'noninterpretivism' ... .").
For an example of the deconstructionist approach that stands outside this formal debate and
critiques the assumptions of each, see S. FisH, Is THERE A TEXT IN Tis CLAss? 338-55 (1980)
("Strictly speaking, 'getting back-to-the-text' is not a move one can perform, because the text one
gets back to will be the text demanded by some other interpretation and that interpretation will be
presiding over its production."). See also Levinson, Law as Literatur4 60 Tam L. Rv. 373, 380
(1982).
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than kind.38 By illustrating the strengths and weaknesses of each herme-
neutical approach, I argue that each contains probing insights as well as
profound blindnesses. Taken together, however, they provide a partial
solution to the Madisonian dilemma and promise to deal more effectively
with one of the perennial problems of our history-the race and class-
based domination of African Americans.
A. Interpretivists
Interpretivists contend that the Constitution is law and that herme-
neutical theories, such as intentionalism and original understanding, dis-
cover rather than create the meaning of constitutional provisions.39 The
intentionalist branch of interpretivism requires that interpreters be faith-
ful to the intent of the authors of the constitutional provision in ques-
tion.40 Intentionalists see no reason why we should accept the intent of
the drafters of a statute, contract, or will as binding and not respect the
intent of the constitutional framers as controlling as well. Intentionalists
argue, therefore, that fidelity to the Framers' intentions must be central
to the meaning of law. Democracy would be threatened if judges cus-
tomarily ignored the manifest intentions of parties and imposed their
own system of values41 on the instruments they interpreted. If interpre-
38. Ronald Dworkin has argued, for instance, that:
[A]ny recognizable theory of judicial review is interpretive in the sense that it aims to
provide an interpretation of the Constitution as an original, foundational legal document,
and also aims to integrate the Constitution into our constitutional and legal practice as a
whole... So the thesis that a useful distinction can be made between theories that insist
on and those that reject interpretation... is more confusing than helpful.
Dworkin, The Forum ofPrnciple, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469, 472 (1981).
39. The belief that a text will yield its inherent and objective truth through application of a
quasi-scientific hermeneutical method of inquiry has been forcefully critiqued in H.-G. GADAMER,
TRUTH AND METHOD 173-242 (J. Weinsheimer & D. Marshall trans. 2d rev. ed. 1989).
40. Literary theorists like Emilio Betti and ED. Hirsch have argued that authorial intent is the
only objectively verifiable measure of a text's meaning. Any other measure of meaning mires the
interpreter in the muck of relativism and subjectivism that immobilizes any attempt to reach a com-
mon understanding of the text. See E. BE=r, DMi HERMENEuTC As ALLUoWMEiNE METHODIK
DER GELrswLssnNscHAFrmN 43-46 (1962); ED. HRScH, THE AIMS Op INTERPRETATION
(1976); E.D. HIRScH, VALDrrY IN INTMEPRETATION (1967). See also Knapp & Michaels, Against
Theory, 8 CRIcAL INQUIRY 723 (1982); Knapp & Michaels, Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics and
Deconstruction, 14 CRIcAL INQUIRY 49 (1987).
41. "Intentionalism" amounts to the contention that interpretation can be saved from the
Heideggerian fate of being "dissolved" into the text, see supra note 36, by reference to the intent of
the authors. Emilio Betti and ED. Hirsch, in developing an intentionalist approach, distinguish
among three operations of interpretation. The cognitive act of understanding a text's meaning by
reference to the author's intent is distinguishable from the normative interpretation of a text's signifi-
cance, which in turn is distinguishable from the practical application of that significance to a specific
situation. It is the first of these operations that gives interpretation its objectivity and saves herme-
neutics from the criticisms of relativism and subjectivism. See Hoy, Interpreting the Law, supra note
35, at 137.
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tation depended on the subjective values of interpreters, there would be
no certainty or continuity in interpretation.
Although Bork is an interpretivist, he seeks to avoid the label of
crass intentionalist.42 He contends that original understanding does not
speak to the subjective psychological intent of the Framers of the Consti-
tution, but rather to "what the public of that time would have under-
stood the words to mean."'43 The question is whether, given this
distinction, his theory of interpretation is any less a creation of constitu-
tional meaning.
It is important to observe that Bork's clarification of his position
was undoubtedly prompted by the prolific criticism of intentionalism as
an untenable judicial philosophy.44 If the subjective intent of the Fram-
ers provides the standard of objectivity, the impracticality is clear. The
open-endedness of such an inquiry permits interpreters to read their per-
sonal values into the. provision by positing what is in most instances an
unknowable, subjective intent.45 First, what people say and what they
intend to say are often different.46 Second, they may intend several
This three-tiered approach bears a close resemblance to Bork's hermeneutics, which seeks to
neutrally derive, define, and apply principles of law. However, whereas Betti may tie authorial in-
tent to subjective psychological meaning, Bork depends on textual meaning discerned by reference to
the public understandings of the time. This meaning in some circumstances may be the same as the
subjective psychological intent of the author (p. 144).
42. Bork follows Professor Henry Monaghan of Columbia, who has written that "the relevant
inquiry must focus on the public understanding of the language when the Constitution was devel-
oped." Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723, 725
(1988).
43. P. 144. Bork explains this revision in his theory in some detail. The argument bears repeat-
ing in full:
Though I have written of the understanding of the ratifiers of the Constitution, since they
enacted it and made it law, that is actually a shorthand formulation, because what the
ratifiers understood themselves to be enacting must be taken to be what the public of that
time would have understood the words to mean. It is important to be clear about this. The
search is not for a subjective intention. If someone found a letter from George Washington
to Martha telling her that what he meant by the power to lay taxes was not what other
people meant, that would not change our reading of the Constitution in the slightest. Nor
would the subjective intentions of all the members of a ratifying convention alter anything.
[p. 144]
44. See Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 445 (1984); Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980); Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REv. 885 (1985).
45. But see McIntosh, supra note 35, at 1 (defending intentionalism against many of the argu-
ments presented here).
46. But see R. POsNER, LAW AND LrrEATuRE 211-14 (1988). Posner discusses orthodox
language theory and its assertion that our ability to convey certain concepts through the medium of
language is an imperfect one. The relationship between the signified (the concept the speaker or
writer has in mind) and the signifier (the language used to convey that concept) is not a fixed one.
The signifier lacks universality (does not mean the same thing in different societies and at different
times) and is overdetermined (contains more information than is necessary for communicating the
concept). This "noise" within the communication channel illustrates the problem with intentional-
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things simultaneously. 47 Third, even if they say what they intend, and
intend only one thing, application of that intent in a different context
may be impractical and necessitate that the interpreter adjust the intent
to changed circumstances. 48 If any or all of these assertions is true, then
the interpreter cannot extract an intent untainted by her values and sub-
jectivities. Any act of looking to the past is thoroughly infected with
present concerns, predispositions, and values.49
Even if the interpreter clears the hurdle of discerning a specific in-
tent, it is unlikely that there will be only one specific intent. The question
is whose intent should control: the drafters, the Congressmen voting for
the measure, the ratiflers in the various states, or the opponents of the
provision who may have influenced its proponents at various levels of
deliberation and passage are all possibilities. Assuming that the inter-
preter could extract a sufficiently specific intent and we agree that it
should control our contemporary decisions, at what level of abstraction
should we interpret and apply that intention? Are we, for instance, con-
cerned with "the framers' view of equality generally or in their view of
racial segregation in the schools?" 50 The issue of the level of generality is
crucial, as Bork himself realizes (p. 148). In fact, the shape of the ques-
tion frequently determines the shape of the answer.51
Bork attempts to answer the generality question by shifting from an
impractical subjectivism to a feigned socio-historical objectivism that
looks to "what the public of that time would have understood the words
to mean" (p. 144). This answer is intended to rebuff the criticism that
the search for subjective intent requires the reader to read his subjective
values into words that the intentionalist claims have definite and knowa-
ism. Intentionalism assumes more of a connection between that which is signified and the language
used to signify it than can plausibly exist: It assumes a fixed relation between the signifier and
signified such that one can arrive at a determinate account of the signified by analyzing the signifier.
47. See Eskridge, Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 624-25 (1990)
(discussing the indeterminate nature of authorial intent; an author may possess different levels of
intent: a specific intent as applied to a particular case a general intent as to the principles underlying
the text; and a meta-intent of which the author may not be aware).
48. Indeed, Bork recognizes this when he writes:
When there is a known principle to be explicated the evolution of doctrine is inevitable.
Judges given stewardship of a constitutional provision-such as the first amendment-
whose core is known but whose outer reach and contours are ill-defined, face the never-
ending task of discerning the meaning of the provision from one case to the next. There
would be little need for judges and certainly no office for a philosophy of judging-if the
boundaries of every constitutional provision were self-evident. They are not. It is the task
of the judge in this generation to discern how the framers' values, defined in the context of
the world they knew, apply to the world we know. The world changes in which unchang-
ing values find their application. [pp. 167-68]
49. See Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles, 96 HARv. L. REv. 781, 784-85 (1983).
50. G. STONE, supra note 32, at 693.
51. See Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1363, 1371-75 (1984).
1182 [Vol. 1990:1163
TEMPTATION AND FALL
ble meaning. But Bork's move is subject to similar questions: Who is the
relevant public? Do we include in our inquiries members of the "public"
who are largely excluded from and/or subordinated within the social
structure (Native Americans, women, white males who did not hold
property and were not permitted to vote, disenfranchised citizens of the
Confederacy, and those of African descent)?
Even if one narrowly limited the relevant public to those involved in
the ratification, would the members of the group have a universal con-
ception of the meaning of the provision in question? Finally, even if most
individuals agreed to the meaning of equality at some level of abstraction,
would there be any consensus at various levels of concreteness that
would limit the judge's discretion in the way Bork envisions? In other
words, it seems doubtful that the level of abstraction required to demon-
strate unanimity of understanding would provide practical guidance to
judges on specific questions, such as whether the fourteenth amendment
value of equality is consistent with permitting a white student's challenge
to a public institution's affirmative action program. 52
Bork defines the relevant public by informing us that "tihe original
understanding is ... manifested in the words used and in secondary
materials, such as debates at the conventions, public discussion, newspa-
per articles, [and] dictionaries in use at the time... " (p. 144). Because
those who participated in and controlled these institutions and events
were predominantly elite white males, Bork's supposedly neutral judicial
philosophy becomes a proxy for the reproduction of a universe that privi-
leged the narrative and interests of an elite group. But this does not con-
cern him. Indeed, Bork derides those who believe his conclusion
preposterous, and claims that "[a]lmost no one would deny this [that the
sources of original understanding must be as he describes them] .. ,. in
fact almost everyone would find it obvious to the point of thinking it
fatuous to state the matter.. ." (p. 144). Many theorists have not found
this so obvious, however. Consider the following criticism:
Interpretivism... [is] designed to remedy a central problem of liberal
theory by constraining the judiciary sufficiently to prevent judicial tyr-
anny.... [It] attempts to implement the rule of law by assuming that
52. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In the Bakke case, the Court
reached no consensus on the ability of the University of California to use affirmative action to in-
crease the number of minorities in its medical school. Justice Powell wrote the plurality opinion,
which was joined in parts I & V-C by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun. Justices
Marshall and Blackmun joined part II; Justice White joined part III-C. Justice Stevens wrote an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, which was joined by Justices Burger, Stewart, and
Rehnquist. See also Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1091-92 (1981) (discussing Bork's choices
on the level of generality to use in articulating constitutional principles and the inherent non-neutral-
ity of such choices).
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the meanings of words and rules are stable over extended periods....
[But in] imaginatively entering the world of the past, we not only
reconstruct it, but.., we also creatively construct it. For such creativ-
ity is the only way to bridge the gaps between that world and ours.53
Bork's search for an original understanding must unavoidably incorpo-
rate his own understanding, which thereby calls into question any read-
ing thought to rest definitively on an objective historical meaning.
B. Noninterpretivists
Noninterpretivists, like interpretivists, are not a monolithic group.54
Generally, however, they contend that the Framers' intent is not binding,
even if interpreters can accurately discern that intent.55 More fundamen-
tally, in the process of interpretation, interpretivists necessarily create
meaning that is independent of the Framers' intent-no matter how the
notion of "intent" is understood. 56 As a theory of understanding and
interpreting the Constitution, original understanding thus creates-
rather than discovers-constitutional meaning in two ways. First, it per-
mits the judge to make a host of value choices in his examination of
"what the public of that time would have understood the words to mean"
(p. 144). Second, it articulates a standard and permits judges to deter-
mine when that standard should and should not apply. This leads to the
argument of over- and underinclusiveness, the necessary play in the
joints, that was discussed in the previous PartY5
Although noninterpretivists believe that interpretivism, when
stripped of its pretensions of neutrality and objectivity, is noninterpretiv-
ism as well, they share with the interpretivists the belief that the Consti-
tution has authoritative meaning. Because the process of interpretation
is necessarily a process that gives meaning to the word, judges, and schol-
ars should explicitly acknowledge the nature of the values that inform
meaning and explore their implications for the role of judges. Indeed, it
is often paradoxically contended that this conception of the judicial role
53. Tushnet, supra note 49, at 784-85, 800.
54. For a brief synopsis of noninterpretive approaches that draw on natural law, moral philoso-
phy, tradition, consensus, and representation-reinforcement, see G. STONE, supra note 32, at 694.
55. There are important exceptions even to this statement, however. Michael Perry, for in-
stance, defends originalism as a theory of interpretation, but argues that his noninterpretivist view
simply is a better theory. According to Perry, constitutional provisions often contain an aspirational
meaning in addition to their original meaning. Original meaning should control when there is no
aspirational meaning or when there is such a meaning, but it does not prohibit the legislative act in
question. But when an aspirational meaning is present and relevant, the judge should apply it. Be-
cause fundamental aspirational meanings are so highly indeterminate, in the final assessment, "the
judge should rely on her own beliefs as to what the aspiration requires." M. PERRY, MoRALTrY,
PoLIncs, AND LAW 149 (1988).
56. See supra text accompanying note 53.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 15-34.
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conforms more closely to the Framers' intentions. That is, they argue
that the Framers understood the relationship between words and mean-
ing, that abstract terms were susceptible to varying interpretations that
permit society to adapt to changing social contexts. Madison's herme-
neutic theory is most vividly expressed in The Federalist No. 37:
The use of words is to express ideas. Perspicuity therefore requires,
not only that the ideas should be distinctly formed, but that they
should be expressed by words distinctly and exclusively appropriate to
them. But no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases
for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include many, equivo-
cally denoting different ideas. Hence it must happen, that however
accurately objects may be discriminated in themselves, and however
accurately the discrimination may be conceived, the definition of them
may be rendered inaccurate, by the inaccuracy of the terms in which it
is delivered. And this unavoidable inaccuracy must be greater or less,
according to the complexity and novelty of the objects defined. When
the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their own
language, his meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and
doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated. 58
If Madison understood that words exist without a fixed meaning, the
argument follows that those who interpret in the name of fidelity to his
intent or the original understanding of his time should also factor the
inadequacy of language into their analyses.
Interpretivism's claim of neutrality is predicated on the contention
that judges apply the law in accordance with values that are not their
own, but rather those of the Framers or the public at the time of ratifica-
tion. Noninterpretivists claim that interpreters are equally neutral when
they derive and apply values from sources other than their own subjec-
tive preferences. The argument against noninterpretivism-that in look-
ing to other sources to elucidate the meaning of the Constitution, it
necessarily encourages judges to read their own values into the Constitu-
tion-loses force because the play in the joints of interpretivism permits
similar abuse. Ultimately we must depend, under either model, on the
integrity, intellectual honesty, and practical reasoning of those who are
the guardians of our rights.5 9
Noninterpretivists use theories about tradition, consensus, represen-
tation-reinforcement, and moral philosophy to determine their values,
link those values to the Constitution, and attempt to demonstrate how
58. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
59. See Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982) (discussing the pos-
sibilities of bounded interpretation).
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their theories can guide judges in decisionmaking. 60 In the words of one
noninterpretivist, Michael Perry,
[Noninterpretive review [serves] an important, even indispensable,
function. It [enables] us, as a people, to keep faith with... [our com-
mitment] to struggle incessantly to see beyond, and then to live be-
yond, the imperfections of whatever happens at the moment to be the
established moral conventions.... [It] enables us to take seriously...
the possibility that there are right answers to political-moral
problems. 61
In contrast, from Bork's perspective, the important question is whether
the noninterpretivist's appropriation of values from various sources
opens the door to judicial tyranny. Should we be comfortable with the
noninterpretivist reconciliation of the Madisonian dilemma? Although
the judicial philosophy of original understanding may allow considerable
discretion, might it not be preferable to a more open-ended noninterpre-
tivist hermeneutics? Consider the limits to judicial discretion articulated
by one noninterpretivist:
As we confront the multiple language-meanings permitted by many of
the open-textured provisions of the Constitution, the only apparent
standard we can bring to bear in evaluating competing arguments for
one or another interpretative methodology... is the extent to which
they promote a good and just society
... I want to claim that the source or basis of our Constitution's
authority is in what might be described either as a shared moral con-
sciousness or identity, or as a deeply-layered and shared consensual
attitude toward certain stories about and norms of political morality
that are understood by a sizable number of our people as representa-
tional of the value and importance of the Constitution.62
Interpretivists claim that the text of the Constitution provides the
necessary boundaries to judicial discretion. Noninterpretivists claim that
judges must go beyond this limited source and look to moral philosophy,
tradition, and consensus to find the proper limits. Both groups, however,
claim that these limits can be found. Both groups are also vulnerable to
the powerful accusations of indeterminacy leveled by the
deconstructionists.
60. See, ag., Lupu, Untangling the Strands ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MicH. L. Rnv.
981, 985, 1040-41 (1979); Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond)
Recent Ca4 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 417, 425 (1976); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitu-
tional Double Standard. Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 284 (1973). For a discus-
sion of representation reinforcement as a theory of constitutional interpretation and a critique of
tradition and consensus theories, see J. ELY, supra note 37, at 1-11.
61. M. PERRY, THE CONsTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 101-02 (1982).
62. Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of Consti-
tutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 603, 613-15 (1985).
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C. Deconstructionists
Deconstructionists, standing outside the formal hermeneutic debate,
contend that both interpretivism and noninterpretivism erroneously as-
sume that the Constitution has objective and neutral meaning. Interpre-
tivists claim that meaning is ascertained by reference to the intent of the
Framers or the original understanding at the time of ratification.
Noninterpretivists claim that meaning is ascertained by reference to
sources extraneous to-but consistent with-the Constitution. These
sources fill in the gaps intentionally created by the Framers. Both ap-
proaches resonate with assumptions of objectivity and neutrality, thereby
leading to the conclusion that the Constitution is authoritative and
binding.
Deconstructionists argue that this appearance of neutrality and ob-
jectivity in "discovering" the law is illusory. The outside theories used
by noninterpretivists are no more determinative of the interpretive pro-
cess than the ambiguities in the constitutional text. Thus, the dichotomy
between interpretivism and noninterpretivism is illusory as well. As one
deconstructionist put it:
[W]hile there are always mechanisms for ruling out readings, their
source is not the text but the presently recognized interpretive strate-
gies for producing the text.... Strictly speaking, getting "back-to-the-
text" is not a move one can perform, because the text one gets back to
will be the text demanded by some other interpretation and that inter-
pretation will be presiding over its production.63
Every interpretative act produces meaning. The text is susceptible to
multiple interpretations and need not be seen as requiring any one deter-
minative outcome. This is no less true of those constitutional clauses
whose meaning seems unequivocal, the "hard case" for the deconstruc-
tionist. For instance, the Constitution states that "[n]o person... shall
be eligible to the office of President... who shall not have attained to the
Age of thirty five Years ... ."64 Some deconstructionists have argued
that the interpretation of this clause is still a matter of producing, rather
than discovering meaning. That is, the clause can be read to mean that
no person shall be eligible to attain the office who does not have the "ma-
turity" of a thirty-five year old.65
The deconstructionist argues that the meaning of the clause is not
fixed even when the intent is determined. In other words, Bork's as-
63. S. FISH, supra note 37, at 347, 354.
64. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
65. See Peller, The Metaphysics ofAmerican Law, 73 CAL L. REv. 1151, 1174 (1985); Tushnet,
4 Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 683, 686-88
(1985).
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sumption that we know that those who drafted the clause intended the
more "objective" numerical measure of thirty-five years, rather than the
more intangible measure of "maturity" is not dispositive of the problem.
The deconstructionist's argument is that the "maturity" interpretation
would not be incompatible with the constellation of words that comprise
this section of the Constitution. The words themselves, contrary to what
Bork posits, have no fixed meaning that we might decipher by appealing
to the common or original understanding of that day. There is always a
gap between the words we choose to signify our concepts and the con-
cepts signified by our words. 6
As Madison realized, something is always lost in the translation of
concepts to language. 67 There are far too few words to express the multi-
ple variations of any given conceptA8 By necessity, we attempt to find
words that best express the range of any given concept-a linguistic com-
mon denominator. Thus, the language signifier "thirty-five years," it
might be argued, became a shorthand for the Framers' concerns that the
weight and responsibility of such an important office could only be
shouldered by those emotionally and psychologically equipped to handle
its demands. In other words, looking at those individuals likely to aspire
to be President during that day, the Framers thought that by the age of
thirty-five, such men would have the requisite degree of education, expe-
rience, and maturity to handle the job.
Examining those individuals who might reasonably aspire to the of-
fice today, we might believe that changes in education, work experience,
and the increased complexity of the office in a modem, industrial-welfare
society have widened the gulf between numerical age and capacity as the
Framers knew it. Perhaps the maturity of a thirty-five year old in 1789
who might aspire to the office is the functional equivalent of a forty-five
year old who might aspire to that position today.
By discussing what I see as the "hard case" for the deconstruction-
ist, I have attempted to illustrate the pervasive nature of the critique.
Not even those clauses that seem to defy conflicting interpretation allow
interpreters to believe that their results are somehow mandated rather
66. See Tushnet, supra note 65.
67. See supra text accompanying note 58.
68. We all have had the experience of writing something and having it quoted back to us with
an interpretation that we had not previously considered but that we, nevertheless, recognized as
consistent with the concepts we were attempting to convey. More unhappily, perhaps, we have
experienced those words being quoted back to us with an interpretation we believed to be inconsis-
tent with what we were thinking, but which on the face of the words themselves we had to concede
was plausible. Because we were present to correct the interpretation, the problem did not appear to
be overly troubling. It is quite troubling, however, when, as in constitutional interpretation, those
whose concepts are conveyed through the medium of language cannot similarly be consulted.
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than chosen. If the above argument regarding the hard case is in any
way convincing, it obviates the need to demonstrate that the far more
ambiguous language of the fourteenth amendment also is susceptible to
multiple interpretations, all of which involve the production rather than
the discovery of meaning. Indeed, we have explored much of this already
with regard to Bork's rationalization of Brown. Notwithstanding impor-
tant insights provided by the deconstructionist's critique, however, weak-
nesses abound in this approach.
First, the linguistic possibility of multiple interpretations does not
rule out the possibility that some interpretations are more sensible than
others. One critic of deconstruction has observed that:
[D]econstruction exaggerates the theory of interpretation .... [F]rom
its destruction of the ideal of determining from the author's intention
the one and only appropriate reading of the text, it tends to conclude
too quickly that the text could mean anything to any number of differ-
ent readers. This inference is mistaken, however, since from the fact
that any particular context for making sense of a text can be called into
question it does not follow that no context is reasonable or justifiable.
Deconstruction infers from the collapse of the ideal of absolute justifi-
cation that no justification is possible.69
For instance, concerning the constitutional stipulation on the age of
those who may seek the office of President, Judge Richard Posner has
argued that "[to read the provision [as the deconstructionists would] is
to take the words of the Constitution... out of their context. And words
have meaning only by virtue of context." 70 According to Posner, the
political and cultural context of the age thirty-five stricture includes
a desire to establish orderly means of succession of officials, a practice
of recording birth dates, and frequent use by lawmakers of arbitrary
deadlines (as in statutes of limitations and in the age of majority)-
makes it apparent that the framers of the Constitution wanted to lay
down a flat rule as to age of eligibility, so that everyone would know in
advance of the election whether the candidates were eligible. It would
be absurd if, after the election of a 40-year old as President of the
United States, someone (the loser, perhaps) could bring suit to void the
election by showing that the winner was less mature than the average
35-year old had been in 1787 .... 71
Of course, deconstructionists are not concerned with the practical
problems of administration raised by Posner's retort. They merely wish
to illustrate the high degree of dissonance, or "noise" that exists between
the concepts an author conceives in her mind when she writes provisions
69. Hoy, Interpreting the Law, supra note 35, at 169.
70. R. POSNER, supra note 46, at 219-20 (1988); see also J. SEARLE, EXPRESSION AN[D MEAN-
ING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF SPEECH Acrs 80 (1979).
71. R. POSNER, supra note 46, at 220.
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and the play in the words she chooses to convey those concepts. One
cannot depend on context to escape this problem, for the very point of
deconstruction is to challenge the notion that context is somehow more
fixed than the words that attempt to express a concept. Thus, the con-
cern for maturity may very well be a part of the relevant context; ignore
that possibility and one finds in context what one reads into context. The
deconstructionist's argument is designed to force Posner and others who
argue in a similar vein to concede that their interpretations, for some set
of reasons, lie outside the text itself at a more practical level. Once the
interpretation is seen as based on practicality, Posnerian intentionalism is
defeated. Practicality is necessarily relative and open to different out-
comes when the circumstances that made the interpretation the most
practical one change.
Unfortunately, however, the aim of some deconstructionists is not to
force either Posner and Bork or their noninterpretivist interlocutors to
this point of realization about the nature of interpretation. This brings
me to the second problem of deconstruction. Taken to its extreme posi-
tion, deconstruction defeats every attempt to understand a text, which is
the very purpose of hermeneutics. If every text contains an infinite
number of meanings, if every context can be refashioned as a merely sub-
jective production of meaning, then there is no ground on which one
interpretation may be preferred over another.
Deconstruction (or "dissemination," as Derrida calls it) goes as far as
it can with the thought that the text might be infinitely complex, and
allow infinitely many readings. This thought may be well-intended in
its desire to insure that the potential complexity of the text is not un-
derestimated, but projecting it as a fundamental principle of under-
standing and interpretation is philosophical overkill. 72
Deconstruction can paralyze us and leave us unable to engage in the
practical requirements of interpretation.
D. Reconciliation
In examining these three approaches, it seems clear to me that there
is something worthwhile and misleading about each. Certainly the inter-
pretivists have the better of the argument when they urge that what we
know about the intent of the Framers or the original understanding at
the time of ratification is not irrelevant to the process of interpretation.
They are equally as wrong, however, when they argue that reliance on
original understanding is, in some manner, fully determinative of what
judges in the 20th century should decide.
72. Hoy, Interpreting the Law, supra note 35, at 169.
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Certainly noninterpretivists have it right when they argue that cer-
tain constitutional provisions were intended to provide judges with the
flexibility to adapt to societal changes, and that the search for the origi-
nal understanding paradoxically might frustrate the Framers' intentions.
They are incorrect, however, when they assume that interpretation
should divorce itself from what we can know about the concerns that
motivated the ratification of various provisions. Constitutional provi-
sions are not simply abstract intellectual propositions. They are often the
result of a socially transformative struggle, rare moments of democratic
enlightenment in which great strides toward a more just and equitable
community are made; judges should not dismiss lightly the context for
such insights encapsulated in the constitutional provisions they interpret.
Finally, deconstructionists have it wrong when they claim that the
effort to understand and interpret the text is impossible, and when they
thoroughly undermine the authoritative nature of the Constitution.
Surely they are correct, however, to bring to our attention the profound
complexity of the text and the perennially troublesome nature of inter-
preting it. They are at least partially correct, that is, to contend that
when interpretivists and noninterpretivists seek to articulate objective
foundations-whether textual or extratextual-for the understandings
they draw from abstract constitutional concepts, no such effort can pro-
vide a determinative understanding of that clause. If the present is con-
ditioned by the past, then the reconstruction of the past is no less
conditioned by our present. Such insights might be seen as a helpful
palliative for our propensity to engage in overrationalization. It reminds
us that although the Constitution must be interpreted to respond to the
exigencies of our changing existence, it is we who are responsible for the
results of those interpretations, and not 18th and 19th century Framers,
contemporary moral philosophers, or legal theorists.
The question of how we begin to reconcile these important insights
is a difficult one. When is original understanding important? In what
context is reference to extratextual sources enabling? How can we appre-
ciate the full complexity of the text and its interpretation, yet contend
that it is in some way binding? This Essay offers only a partial solution
to the dilemma of legal hermeneutics. It concerns the thirteenth, four-
teenth and fifteenth amendments and the plight of African Americans
under the law of the land. I suggest that in this critically important area
of constitutional law, the conflict between legal interpretation as the dis-
covery or production of meaning can be solved. Courts can commit
themselves to principles of adjudication that respond to the problems
raised by the Madisonian dilemma and fulfill the noble aims of adjudicat-
ing with justice and mercy.
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IV. BRowN v BOARD OF EDUcATIoN. THE "THIRD CHOICE"
As I have indicated above, Bork, in his effort to distinguish discov-
ery of meaning from the creation of meaning, frequently confuses the
two. For instance, he contends that the original understanding of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is sufficiently clear
to validate the result in Brown 73 and to invalidate racial quotas.74 Ac-
cording to him, both of these conclusions are illustrations of neutrally
discovering and applying the meaning of the equal protection clause. He
argues that the Framers and ratifiers may have thought equality and seg-
regation were consistent, but they simply had it wrong. Given the choice
between continued judicial support of the separate but equal doctrine set
out in Plessy-a doctrine requiring the Court tirelessly to decide whether
the state had achieved true equality of segregated facilities and pro-
grams-and abandoning the separate but equal doctrine altogether, the
Court was bound by the Constitution to choose the second alternative.
According to Bork,
IThere was no third choice. Either choice would violate one aspect of
the original understanding, but there was no possibility of avoiding
that. Since equality and segregation were mutually inconsistent,
though the ratifiers did not understand that, both could not be
honored. When that is seen, it is obvious the Court must choose equal-
ity and prohibit state-imposed segregation. The purpose that brought
the fourteenth amendment into being was equality before the law, and
equality, not separation, was written into the text. [p. 82]
In summarily rejecting the possibility of a third choice, Bork reads
"equality" to mean "color-blind treatment," thereby curtailing the possi-
bility of race-specific remedies.
This cursory conclusion is troubling for a number of reasons. First,
Bork concedes that both concepts, segregation and equality, are part of
73. Bork argues that although the holding in Brown is perfectly consistent with the original
understanding of the fourteenth amendment, the rationale in that case, which depended on the bale-
ful psychological effects of segregation, cannot be squared with the original understanding of the
fourteenth amendment's framers. See supra text accompanying notes 16-21. Bork argues:
The inescapable fact is that those who ratified the amendment did not think it outlawed
segregated education or segregation in any aspect of life... Plessy had recognized that
segregation could have a psychological impact and found it essentially irrelevant. It is
difficult to believe that those who ratified the fourteenth amendment and also passed or
continued in force segregation laws did not similarly understand the psychological effects
of what they did. They didn't care. [pp. 75-76]
74. For Bork's discussion of racial quotas, see pp. 101-10. See also John McLaughlin's One on
One (PBS television broadcast July 7, 1990) (transcript available from author). In this interview,
Bork characterized Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 U.S. 2997 (1990)-which upheld racial
preferences in FCC policies governing the transfer of broadcast licenses-as "a terrible decision,"
one that will "introduce all kinds of racial preferences, gender preferences, ethnic preferences to our
law, quotas, and I think that is, one, contrary to the Constitution, which as it should be, color blind,
and-we thought it was color blind." Id at 5.
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the original understanding. If that is so, I hardly see how the Court is
warranted, under his theory, in departing from either. That the Court's
task in determining whether equality of facilities had been achieved is a
difficult and time consuming one should not diminish its constitutional
obligation to give the fullest interpretation to both norms if both are con-
stitutionally mandated.
Second, when Bork gives primacy to the concept of equality over
segregation, simply because the former actually appears in the constitu-
tional provision, he belies his own interpretive commitment. We already
have observed that interpreters must discern the original understanding
of such open-ended values as equal protection by reference to a host of
factors that expose the absence of any universal and intrinsic meaning.
In their search for the original understanding, interpretivists cannot sep-
arate equality from segregation as neatly as Bork contends: It might be
argued that the meaning of "equality" to many in the 19th century was
quite consistent with the institution of Jim Crow. Indeed, this supposed
consistency was enshrined in the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson. Thus, the concept of equality depended as much on the con-
cept of "segregation" as this concept assumed a satisfactory degree of
equality. Bork contends that the Court had to privilege equality over
segregation because "[tlhe purpose that brought the fourteenth amend-
ment into being was equality before the law, and equality, not separation,
was written into the text" (p. 82). But this is a false dichotomy because,
on his reading of the history, "equal" was written with "segregation" in
mind. When segregation is factored out-as it was in Brown-it is not
compatible with Borkian original understanding.
Thus, to argue that Brown was correct to give primacy to the value
of equality over segregation is to assume what must be proven, that 19th
century Framers and ratifiers understood equality to be incompatible
with segregation. By Bork's own admission, however, this is precisely
what cannot be shown. Any attempt to separate the two values in order
to justify Brown departs from the original understanding.
Bork's acknowledgement that segregation was widely practiced at
the time of the passage of the fourteenth amendment (p. 75) would seem
to lead to the conclusion that the original understanding of equal protec-
tion required the Court to uphold Plessy's doctrine of separate but equal.
But Bork ignores this conclusion because he wants to vindicate Brown
under his own theory. In so doing, Bork also ignores the reality of
American life, which was separate but unequaL Separate but truly equal
would have been a radical change-one immensely beneficial to African
Americans and consistent with original understanding. Bork, in his rush
to square an interpretivist position with Brown, fails to consider a third
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choice: The Court could have required a faithful commitment to sepa-
rate but equal until the latter led to the erosion of the former.
Even if we assume that Bork's oxymoronic position is correct-that
although both equality and separation were part of the original under-
standing, the Warren Court was justified in subordinating separation to
equality-we need not conclude with him that "there was no third
choice" available to the Brown Court. If the Framers were wrong about
the compatibility of segregation and equality, then they also may have
been wrong to believe that a color-blind society is even possible without a
substantial interim of race-specific relief designed to liberate the descend-
ants of slaves subordinated by race-specific legal and extra-legal activity.
The choice elided by Bork-the third choice-would rule that dis-
crimination on the basis of race, designed to deny equality to African
Americans, was incompatible with the equal protection clause. The
Court might have reasoned in subsequent cases that race-specific legisla-
tion and judicial decrees designed to vindicate the equality of a race made
unequal by centuries of pervasive societal racism-through judicial, leg-
islative, executive, and private practices-is a constitutional means of se-
curing the constitutional end of protecting this class of citizens, whose
subordination precipitated a civil war and necessitated the creation of the
amendment at issue. In other words, the Court might have concluded
that the value of equality embraced by the amendment imposes an af-
firmative duty. It requires a commitment to the equalization of resources
and opportunities of the African-American community, resources and
opportunities diminished by our society's tragic history of discrimination
and racism against, and pervasive subordination of, those of African de-
scent. This is a central, although not exclusive end of the amendment.
To embrace this third choice is to argue that the original understanding
not only supports Brown, as Bork acknowledges, but also supports af-
firmative action quotas such as those used in Bakke 75 and Croson, 76 a
remedy Bork flatly rejects as inconsistent with his selective reading of the
original understanding.77
75. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
76. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1988).
77. One historian has argued that a commitment to the original understanding of the four-
teenth amendment would strongly support race-specific affirmative action plans and that "[w]ith one
exception, [the] entire body of case law is devoid of any reference to the original intent of the framers
of the fourteenth amendment." Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REv. 753, 753 (1985) (footnote omitted). Schnapper argues that:
[Tihe legislative history of the fourteenth amendment is not only relevant to but dispositive
of the legal dispute over the constitutional standards applicable to race-conscious affirma-
tive action plans. From the closing days of the Civil War until the end of civilian Recon-
struction some five years later, Congress adopted a series of social welfare programs whose
benefits were expressly limited to blacks. These programs were generally open to all
1194 [Vol. 1990:1163
Vol. 1990:1163] TEMPTATION AND FALL 1195
Bork rejects this third choice because he has read a definitive mean-
ing into the fourteenth amendment value of equality. He equates "equal-
ity" with "color blindness," and, thus, the thought of a benign racial
classification is intolerably contradictory and has no place in constitu-
tional interpretation. Understanding why Bork equates equality with
color blindness is especially puzzling because of his scant discussion of
the historical evidence on the original understanding of the
amendment.78
Bork's attempt to arrive at the meaning of the fourteenth amend-
ment reveals the weakness of his interpretivism. The text and historical
evidence are either inconclusive or supportive of multiple interpretations.
Thus, on the indeterminacy of the historical evidence one could conclude
that Bork's approach depended on his own preferences. Professor Paul
Brest critiqued Bork in this way, arguing that the "very adoption of such
a principle [as original understanding] ... demands an arbitrary choice
among levels of abstraction" 79 and, therefore, cannot be thought of as
neutral. In response, Bork contends that the choice is not arbitrary be-
blacks, not only to recently freed slaves, and were adopted over repeatedly expressed objec-
tions that such racially exclusive measures were unfair to whites. The race-conscious Re-
construction programs were enacted concurrently with the fourteenth amendment and
were supported by the same legislators who favored the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. This history strongly suggests that the framers of the amendment could not
have intended it generally to prohibit affirmative action for blacks or other disadvantaged
groups.
Id at 754.
78. For recent work on the history of the Reconstruction Amendments, see Schnapper, supra
note 77 (arguing that the historical evidence conclusively demonstrates that the original understand-
ing supports the use of benign race-conscious measures and should not be limited by the color-blind
philosophies offered by many); see also M. CURTis, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FouR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 91 (1986) (concluding that "debates in the Thirty-
seventh, Thirty-eighth, and Thirty-ninth Congresses show that Republicans were unhappy with the
protection individual liberties had received from the states. Concern for individual liberty together
with increased concern for the rights of blacks shaped the Fourteenth Amendment."). But see W.
NELSON, supra note 17, at 8. Nelson raises the fundamental question of how "the Republican Party
in 1866, and for that matter the bulk of the Northern electorate, [could] have been committed simul-
taneously to federal protection of black rights and to preservation of the existing balance of federal-
ism." He contends that "[t]oday the protection of individual rights, typically by the judiciary,
appears hopelessly at odds with the free exercise of legislative power, especially by the states." Id
Although this conflict may exist when the Court rules a state law unconstitutional, the two aspira-
tions are quite consistent when states design affirmative action programs for blacks. The Court
would be upholding black rights and satisfying federalism concerns by deferring to local decision
makers. Yet the Court has consistently ruled such plans unconstitutional. See, e.g., City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (minority set-aside plan for bidding on city contracts
held unconstitutional); Wygant Bd. of Educ. v. Jackson, 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (invalidating program
that gave preferential protection against layoffs to minority employees); Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (while upholding use of racial preference system, the Court struck
down set-aside program as violating equal protection).
79. Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE LJ. 1063, 1091 (1981).
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cause judges are obligated to choose the level of generality that "the text
and historical evidence warrant" (p. 149). Bork admits that he does not
know what the historical evidence shows concerning the fourteenth
amendment, yet he confidently adopts a level of abstraction--color blind-
ness-that assumes intimate knowledge of that evidence (pp. 149-50).
Bork sees the choice between the levels of abstractions-the race-specific
means of black equality and the color-blind means of racial equality-as
an either/or dilemma. I recharacterize the choice as a both/and possibil-
ity that moves us toward a truly integrative jurisprudence. What follows
is an outline of how this project might take shape. I will be the first to
admit that what I propose is a major undertaking, but a necessary one,
nevertheless. It involves a synthesis of the various insights of each ap-
proach outlined and critiqued above. It responds to the Madisonian di-
lemma, at least in the limited area for which I have defined it, as well as
any other theory vying for jurisprudential primacy.
V. TOWARD AN INTEGRATIVE JURISPRUDENCE
Although I have provided some criticisms of deconstruction above,
it is important to reiterate some of the positive insights this approach
provides. First, its penchant for radical indeterminacy of the tent con-
stantly reminds us of the extent to which we as interpreters make and
remake our world through the symbols and metaphors of law we em-
brace. Even after constitutional meaning is demystified, stripped of some
of the ontological and metaphysical overlay, and exposed as a set of as-
sumptions reflective of certain historical periods, social relations, and
perspectives, a pressing question remains: Why should we give contin-
ued deference to one set of assumptions over another? When some
deconstructionists conclude, however, that because there are no right and
wrong interpretations there are neither better nor worse ones, the entire
project of hermeneutics is undermined and nihilism becomes the politics
of choice.
Many deconstructionists, however, are neither moral relativists nor
philosophical nihilists. The project of deconstruction is merely a weapon
used in the battle to maneuver or position oneself in the
counterhegemonic struggle.8 0 Deconstruction is an intellectual sword
used against the evils of oppression and hierarchy that are empowered by
the unexamined political choices that limit our capacity to envision alter-
native social arrangements. The goal of deconstruction is to rip the veil
of objectivity and neutrality from the law, thereby exposing not only the
80. See A. GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBoOKs 210-76 (Q. Hoare & G.
Smith trans. 1971).
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foundationless qualities of its contrived epistemological foundations, but
also stimulating those lulled into complacency by the promises of
neutrality to take control of their destinies as well. Such a project as-
sumes an agenda, however unexpressed or undeveloped it may be.
Part of that agenda is to give voice to the voiceless. It is to contend
that interpretation is the process of producing meaning, and that the
materials, perspectives, values, and experiences out of which that mean-
ing is produced should not be the exclusive province of a small group of
elites. It is to believe, as Robert Cover believed, in the "jurisgenerative"
quality of law, that law is narrative and is produced in insular settings
throughout society, that the law issuing forth from the decrees of judges
is but one narrative or voice given primacy over others through the force
and authority of the state.81 It is to pick up where Cover left off, taking
on the awesome task of articulating and developing a jurisprudential
framework capable of giving greater expression to suppressed narratives
and articulating the conditions under which certain narratives should be
subordinated to others. This is a far cry from nihilism; it is consistent
with the noblest aspirations of jurisprudential endeavor.
Bork's notion of original understanding continues to frustrate this
project by further obfuscating the tasks of jurisprudence and judging. By
equating constitutional meaning with "what the public of that time
would have understood the words to mean" (p. 144) and extracting that
meaning from the plain language of the provisions, convention debates,
newspaper articles, and dictionaries of that day, Bork unduly limits his
notion of the "public" to elites who debated in conventions, wrote news-
paper articles, and compiled dictionaries.
This is troubling for two reasons. First, many of the creators of this
original understanding, even many Northern Republicans who supported
the Reconstruction Amendments, had not themselves overcome the ra-
cist constructs and values that informed and defined their meaning-gen-
erating activities. To pay undue deference to their meaning would
universalize and enshrine the very forms of racism and oppression that
the Civil War, years of resistance, and a civil rights movement were
designed to overcome. As a society, we hopefully have moved beyond
many of the prejudices and limitations that characterized the thinking of
that day. America in the 19th century, however, was not even a formally
81. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative 97 HARv. L.
REv. 4, 9 (1983) ("A legal tradition is ... part and parcel of a complex normative world. The
tradition includes not only a corpus juris, but also a language and a mythos-narratives in which the
corpus juris is located by those whose wills act upon it."); see also Cover, Violence and the Word, 95
YALE LJ. 1601, 1609-18 (discussing limits on the commonality and coherence of meaning that can
be achieved by a legal tradition based on the organization of violence).
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open and democratic society. Too many voices were excluded and too
many minds were shaped by the 19th century's racist context for us to
accept definitively and unconditionally its original understanding of
amendments that revolutionized our system of government and social
relations.
Second, Bork's definition of law as public meaning at the time of
ratification is so malleable that the potential for interpretive abuse should
be apparent. Whose voice will he hear in convention debates? Which
newspapers will he read and whose editorials will most reflect the con-
sensus for which he searches? Whose common sense will count in dis-
cerning the plain meaning of the language and which permutation of a
dictionary's definition will he endorse? In short, I fear that Bork's ap-
proach will continue to silence the voices and narratives of those whose
input we should most seek, those for whose immediate benefit the Recon-
struction Amendments were proposed-persons of African descent.
By concluding, however, that the fourteenth amendment requires an
interpretive commitment to color-blindness, Bork obviates the need for
such input. Ours is a constitutional history founded on distinctions of
color and race employed to enslave and subordinate people of African
descent. Bork's color-blindness inflicts an institutional amnesia, and this
painful past of societal discrimination and subordination is conveniently
forgotten. The clean slate of color-blindness is offered as a panacea for
centuries of black oppression, and the neutrality in which laws are writ-
ten today is made to appear unconnected to the pervasive state and pri-
vate racism of yesterday. This approach to constitutional interpretation
vindicates the past by ignoring it and denies the possibilities of the pres-
ent by distorting that as well. As constitutional interpreters we might
remedy this institutional amnesia by incorporating the African-American
narrative through insights provided by both interpretivists and
noninterpretivists.
The major proposition that I argue below is that it is important to
have some sense of an amendment's meaning at the time of ratification
and the meaning given to it through subsequent interpretation. Past
meaning is not important simply because we believe that it is fixed and
somehow determinative of what judges should decide; it is important be-
cause we are never capable of totally escaping our past and its traditions.
Because tradition conditions the understandings we bring to the interpre-
tive project82 and because these understandings inform our interpretive
82. In developing this argument, I draw on the works of Hans Gadamer, whose hermeneutics
principally relies on the interpreter's encounter with tradition:
[Tihe horizon of the past, out of which all human life lives and which exists in the form of
tradition, is always in motion. When our historical consciousness transposes itself into
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efforts either consciously or subconsciously, confronting the past is a way
of controlling it even as it exerts its influence over our interpretations.8 3
Thus, it is important to explore how we talk about the past and the sub-
stantive ends toward which we direct our knowledge of the past.
Noninterpretivism's most important contribution has been the
decentering of positivist methodologies used to discern constitutional
meaning. Although noninterpretivists may still see the Constitution as
objectively authoritative, they extract that authoritative meaning with a
plurality of analytical devices ranging from philosophy and natural law
to sociological and phenomenological analysis. The methodological de-
vice 4 I prefer to use in talking about constitutional meaning is narrative
and, more specifically, experiential narrative.8 5
Experiential narrative encourages a departure from abstract narra-
tive and a move toward a more phenomenological model of judicial deci-
sionmaking. s6 Because the past is a source of understanding the present,
it is important that we talk about the past in a way that illuminates its
historical horizons, this does not entail passing into alien worlds unconnected in any way
with our own; instead, they together constitute the one great horizon that moves from
within and that, beyond the frontiers of the present, embraces the historical depths of our
self-consciousness.
H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 39, at 304.
83. I understand that tradition is generally ambiguous. One can generally find in tradition
what one seeks. See eg., J. ELY, supra note 37, at 60-63 (contending that there is more than one
American tradition on the question of affirmative action and that the traditions are sufficiently am-
biguous to support conflicting conclusions). One scholar of Gadamer's hermeneutics has explained
the role of tradition in his philosophy in methodological rather than normative terms, however. This
is the understanding of tradition that I am adopting in this argument.
The question is why tradition should be valued so highly. Even if our understanding is
conditioned by a tradition of interpretation, and even if the ideal of a complete break with
past traditions is merely utopian (or dystopian), there may be more point to changing than
to restoring tradition. Gadamer's reply depends precisely on recognizing that to talk about
change is to presuppose an understanding of the history that has led up to the need for
change. This understanding must be assumed to be correct, and thus an element of the call
for change will be the willingness to discuss the importance of this history for the present.
Furthermore, to call for change is at the same time to have a view about how change is.
possible. In order for change to be practicable, and to avoid empty utopianism, it must be
to some extent consistent with the tradition and the antecedent history out of which it
grows.
Hoy, Interpreting the Law, supra note 35, at 156.
84. See J.B. WHmr, WHEN WoRDs LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTI-
TUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER AND COMMuNITY 264-75 (1984) (discussing the way in
which legal authority is formed via conversational dialogues).
85. For a particularly eloquent example of this narrative form, see D. BELL, AND WE ARE
NO'r SAVED (1987); Bell, The Final Report Harvard's Affirmative Action Allegory, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2382 (1989); Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Foreword& The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99
HARv. L.*REv. 4, (1985). See generally Elkins, On the Emergence of Narrative Jurisprudence: The
Humanistic Perspective Finds a New Path, 9 LEGAL STUD. F. 123 (1985); West, Jurisprudence as
Narrative. An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 145 (1985).
86. See Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn
Selves 62 TEx. L. REv. 1563 (1984).
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richness and poverty, its problems and possibilities. Experiential narra-
tive requires judges to disclose their value choices87 and explain their
holdings in terms of people, places and times, rather than in vacuous
syllogisms abstracted from the realities they purport to govern. 88
When we query whether the fourteenth amendment permits the
state to adopt a particular affirmative action plan, the question can never
be posed in an historical or cultural vacuum. We should, therefore, end
the pretense that it ever can be decided in one. The process of searching
out the meaning of the amendment for this or that affirmative action plan
is conditioned by certain preunderstandings. These preunderstandings
are a result of our having been thrown into a context of tradition and
culture that shapes the lens through which we look to the past for mean-
ing.89 Thus, even as we search for meaning, we are influenced by the
rhetoric of court cases, commentary, and cultural complexities that are
themselves mere proxies for the meaning we seek.
But if our look to the past is always conditioned by our changing
contexts, are we left adrift upon the uncharted waters of post-modem
relativism, in which meaning is contingent on the historical times in
which the interpreter lives? Are we left only with subjectivism, in which
meaning is contingent on the experiences of interpreters living in the
same times or the experiences of the same interpreter living in different
times? I think not. But my conclusion is more a presupposition of faith
than a proposition of fact. I contend that the past is important because it
is a valuable source of narrative, a source of talking about what matters
87. See, ag., J. WHrrE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF LAW
139-91 (1985) (contending that what appear to be factual narratives are also fictional and necessarily
express values).
88. As Hoy observes,
Hermeneutical philosophy does not tell interpreters what to do, but it does imply that an
understanding that tries to understand itself (including both its doctrinal and methodologi-
cal commitments) is better than one that does not. For the issue of judicial review, this
point suggests that in the making or appraising of judicial decisions, the theory of judicial
review behind those decisions also ought to be made clear.
Hoy, Interpreting the Law, supra note 35, at 157.
89. One scholar has described the influence of Heidegger on Gadamer's hermeneutics in the
following way:
Gadamer denies that hermeneutics is a "method" and returns to an essential insight about
understanding made by early hermeneutics, one retrieved by Martin Heidegger-the histo-
ricity of our being-in-the world. We are thrown into a world whose context molds us and
limits our imagination and, hence, our options. Our very being is a process of interpreting
our past, which is projected onto us and to which we respond. As Gadamer later put it,
Heidegger's central lesson is "not in what way being can be understood but in what way
understanding is being."
Eskridge, supra note 47, at 617 (quoting H.-G. Gadamer, On the Problem of Self-Understanding, in
PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS (D. Linge ed. 1976)).
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to us in the present. 9° Our encounter with the historical text provides an
opportunity to explore the sources and implications of our own
preunderstandings and commitments. It is only in such a dialogic en-
counter with the text and its interpretive traditions that we gain the op-
portunity to critique and transcend those preunderstandings. 91
Because the fourteenth amendment accommodates different
preunderstandings and narratives, the challenge to judges is to tell us
how and when one narrative should be given primacy over others.92 I
argue below that a central narrative of the fourteenth amendment's his-
tory and tradition is the protection of those of African descent from the
racism and subjugation that has defined and shaped the American
ethos.93 Considering that this narrative competes against other four-
teenth amendment narratives for supremacy, the challenge is to articu-
late those conditions under which the presumption of African-American
protection may be rebutted and other narratives may be given primacy.
As our society evolves, the central question we must ask is what consti-
tutes sufficient protection of this class of citizens. The deconstructionists
are correct in assuming that neither text nor history can provide a defini-
tive answer to this question. The answer is contingent on the ever-chang-
90. For general works on narrative, see ON NAmATivE (W. Mitchell ed. 1980) (a collection of
essays discussing the relationship between narrative and the development of social and psychological
structures); P. RicoEtR, TmiE AND NARRATVE (1984); H. WHITE, TROPICS op DiscouRsE: ES-
SAYS IN CULTURAL CRIcisM (1978); H. WHrrE, METAHISTORY (1973).
91. Gadamer points out that "[i]n fact the horizon of the present is continually in the process of
being formed because we are continually having to test all our prejudices. An important part of this
testing occurs in encountering the past and in understanding the tradition from which we come."
Interpretation, then, is the fusion of "the old and new" into "something of living value." H.-G.
GADAMER, supra note 39, at 306.
92. See Ross, The Richmond Narrative 68 TEx. L. REv. 381, 411-12 (1989) (contending that
judges are storytellers and, as storytellers, have certain ethical obligations to edify their audience).
Ross writes that:
If I tell a story that I cannot imagine has any purpose, or meaning, or use, and if it has no
meaning for you, however true the assertions, perhaps I have violated the central ethical
responsibility of the storyteller ... I believe that Scalia [in Richmond v. Croson] ought to
have not only invited, but also told narratives. He ought to have revealed more of his
perspective and placed himself in the text of his stories. I believe that this is the ethical
responsibility of the judge as storyteller.
Id
93. Charles Lawrence has also discussed this ethos of racism and subjugation:
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which racism has played
and still plays a dominant role. Because of this shared experience, we also inevitably share
many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that attach significance to an individual's race and induce
negative feelings and opinions about nonwhites. To the extent that this cultural belief sys-
tem has influenced all of us, we are all racists. At the same time, most of us are unaware of
our racism. We do not recognize the ways in which our cultural experience has influenced
our beliefs about race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions. In other
words, a large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced by
unconscious racial motivation.
Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REv. 317, 322 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
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ing forms of oppression specific to the historical context in which the
question is posed.
Experiential narrative simply commits us to a way of talking about
the problem that puts the matter in "real" terms-language that en-
hances our capacity to feel another's pain and to share another's vision.
The noninterpretivist judge must use materials extraneous to the text it-
self to assess when society has sufficiently mitigated the disparities in
power and wealth that limit the life opportunities of African Americans
in any given area. Such a determination would warrant greater deference
to other narratives beside the standard interpretation of the constitu-
tional text on the assumption that satisfaction of the central purpose of
the amendment, the protection of the African-American class, is deter-
mined by the relevant sociological data.
Under this approach, general societal discrimination would largely
be presumed, given the tragic history of racism and oppression in the
American experience. Evidence of statistical disparities would be used
by the courts to justify or reject certain remedial measures and to deter-
mine when their task was completed. The touchstone for determining
the scope of the remedy in these cases would be the disparity between the
number of African Americans represented in the area that is the object of
concern and the black population in an appropriate target area. These
remedies need not, however, be limited to the percentage of "qualified"
individuals within the pool of potential members. Such a narrow focus
would only reproduce the inequitable allocation of opportunities inaugu-
rated by the racism and oppression under challenge. Creative ap-
proaches to waivers and remedies for disparities that cannot be rectified
because of real shortages can be developed. If a public or private entity is
unable to find bodies to honor the decree, for instance, it might be re-
quired to pay damages to a specially organized foundation established for
African-American education, training, and recruitment.
Interpretivism's contribution has been to remind us of the impor-
tance of this past and its interpretive traditions. Noninterpretivism puts
a new gloss on interpretivism's message, providing us with the insight
that because we can never escape the influence of those traditions, we
might as well face them in the most constructive manner possible. I have
suggested that the interpretive methodology of experiential narrative ad-
mirably uses both of these insights. My discussion of methodology, how-
ever, is inseparable from ideology. Here, I wish to make that ideological
component more explicit. That is, just as interpretivism is premised on
the assumption that the past plays-and should play-an important role
in our search for meaning, I, too, believe that a conversation with the
times and traditions of the past is both necessary and valuable.
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No war has taken a greater toll on American lives and well being
than the Civil War. Ours was a nation divided against itself, not simply
over the race question in some abstract sense, but over the question of
black subordination. This particular form of subordination divided fami-
lies, fractured loyalties, intensified sectional rivalries, and brought the
country to the brink of disaster. That history should have taught us
something about the role of black subordination in our culture, how it
divides and configures, and how it rationalizes the subordination of white
workers, women, and other minorities who are psychologically compen-
sated for their material subordination by the ideology of white
supremacy. As I see it, the aspirational meaning of the constitutional
fervor of this era was to eradicate the causes of divisiveness-not race in
some abstract sense, but the pervasiveness of black subordination, ratio-
nalized by material misallocations of wealth and power, as well as ideo-
logical structures of oppression.
Because periods of constitutional amendment exemplify moments of
heightened democratic awareness and humanitarian concern, the
Supreme Court should not take such moments lightly,94 even when those
moments are distorted in many ways by the undemocratic qualities that
have often played a role in American life. These are often moments in
which people open themselves to the experiences and sufferings of others,
empathize with those whose stories are not their own, and thereby
glimpse the possibilities of alternative social arrangements that are less
disempowering and oppressive.95 We might think of the Reconstruction
Amendments in this aspirational light.
One important aspiration of these amendments was to confront and
challenge those social arrangements predicated on black inferiority and
white supremacy that robbed all-white as well as black, men as well as
women--of their dignity and human potential. We can fully appreciate
this aspirational meaning only by understanding how the American en-
slavement of, and racism against, African Americans has molded a na-
tional identity, trapped many in the air-tight cages of social and spiritual
poverty, and clouded the interpretive horizons against which we seek to
understand the present in light of the past. Aspirational meaning says
94. See Ackerman, Discovering the Consttution. 93 YALE LJ. 1013, 1020-23, 1046-49 (1984)
(describing constitutional politics as the "highest kind of politics," which should prevail during rare
periods of heightened political consciousness).
95. Richard Rorty describes empathy or solidarity as something
to be achieved not by inquiry but by imagination, the imaginative ability to see strange
people as fellow sufferers. Solidarity is not discovered by reflection but created. It is cre-
ated by increasing our sensitivity to the particular details of the pain and humiliation of
other, unfamiliar sorts of people.
R. RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLiARrrY at xvi (1989).
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something not only about what we were as a nation, but also about what
we hope to become.
Interpretivism must remain cognizant of a past and present in which
widely-held racist beliefs of black inferiority and white supremacy have
been woven into a social fabric of great complexity and intricacy;96 it
must seek to keep one central original insight alive: A nation divided
against itself cannot stand and cannot be free until those of African de-
scent are free from the bondage of racism, poverty, and despair-attrib-
utes that make blacks America's prized scapegoat for the tragedies
visited on all Americans.97 In other words, interpretivism must acknowl-
edge that no meaning of the fourteenth amendment can detach itself
from the realization that throughout America's tragic history of racism,
the subjugation of African Americans has justified the subordination of
women, workers, and other ethnic groups and permeated the narratives
that create (and recreate) our national identity.98
This is an originalism, an interpretivism, that springs from the harsh
and brutal realities of our Nation's history, rather than from some mysti-
cal notion of the Framers' subjective intent or from a reliance on vague
references to the "public understanding of the times." When the search
for meaning is situated within this interpretive commitment, the willing-
ness to declare some legislative acts unconstitutional and to uphold race-
specific remedial classifications may not pose the countermajoritarian dif-
ficulty first envisioned. 99 When courts rule some legislative decisions un-
96. See G.M. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND 44 (1971) (outlining
the arguments of proponents of slavery in the 1830s that it was necessary to preserve the South and
that blacks were unprepared for freedom); see also G.M. FREDRICKSON, THE ARRoGANcE OF RACE
(1988); W. JORDAN, WHrrs OVER BLACK (1968) (tracing the history of attitudes toward blacks
from 1550-1812); C.A. Miller, Constitutional Law and the Rhetoric of Race, in 5 PERSPECTIvES IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 147-200 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971) (arguing that the language and
logic of the Court and the Constitution were used to preserve white dominance).
97. See G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 523-34 (1944); D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND
AMERIcAN LAW § 1.9, at 30 (2d ed. 1980) (contending that black rights are cyclically and ritualisti-
cally extended and sacrificed upon the altars of white political expediency when the self-interest of
elite whites so dictate). Bell argues that "[i]n the resolution of racial issues in America, black inter.
ests are often sacrificed so that identifiably different groups of whites may settle a dispute and estab-
lish or reestablish their relationship." Id
98. See G. MYRDAL, supra note 97, at 524-25 (prejudice toward African Americans, in effect,
creates an exception to the notion that justice must be uniform, this in turn provides a precedent for
denying justice to other groups); J.B. WHrr7, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NA-
TURE OF LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION 430-501, 858-925 (1973) (discussing the legal use of
the language of race and the narrative imagination). For a general account of the role of race rela-
tions in the creation of our national identity, see D. BELL, supra note 97, at 2-24; K. STAMPP, THE
PECULiAR INSTTToN: SLAVERY IN Tim ANTE-BELLUM SouTH (1956); M. TUSHNET, THE
AmERIcAN LAW OF SLAVERY 1810-1860, at 44-70 (1981).
99. See Ackerman, supra note 94. According to Bruce Ackerman,
When the Court invokes the Constitution, it appeals to legal enactments that were ap-
proved by a whole series of majorities- namely the majorities of those representative bod-
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constitutional, they merely defer to the higher form of politics embodied
in the Constitution over the more temporal form of politics embodied in
legislation. And when courts permit race-based affirmative action classi-
fications, they merely encourage government to embrace a central aspira-
tional meaning of the Constitution.
The standard of color-blindness embraced by Bork as the central
meaning of the fourteenth amendment is an abstraction divorced from
the historical context that led to its creation; Bork's move is thus an ex-
plicitly ideological one. My conception of public meaning is an abstrac-
tion as well, but, as I have tried to demonstrate, it is one explained in
terms of the aspirational insights drawn from the historical contexts of
slavery, oppression, and struggles for liberation. 100 Furthermore, I do
not claim that this is the only meaning of the amendment. I claim only
that it is a central one to which proper deference should be paid in our
interpretation of the amendment's purpose and scope.
My argument is that we should own up to, rather than run away
from, one clear and central meaning of the fourteenth amendment-that
the amendment's primary purpose was to protect the class of newly-freed
slaves. Justice Samuel Miller discussed the meaning and purpose of the
Reconstruction Amendments 10 ' in the Slaughter-House Cases:
[O]n the most casual examination of the language of these amend-
ments, no one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose
found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which
none of them would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of
the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and
the protection of the newly made freeman and citizen from the oppres-
ies that proposed and ratified the original Constitution and its subsequent amendments.
Rather than a countermajoritarian difficulty, the familiar platitude identifies an intertem-
poral difficulty.
Id. at 1013.
100. See Ross, supra note 92, at 408 (examining the relationship between ideology and narra-
tive). Ross argues that Scalia and Marshall adopt different forms of storytelling in City of Richmond
v. LA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), Scalia embracing a narrative of abstractions and syllogistic
reasoning and Marshall embracing a narrative of lived experience.
Thus Scalia and Marshall tell different narratives. Scalia invites the reader to make his
abstractions and metaphors concrete and vivid. Marshall tells stories in explicit detail,
stories with details not likely to be provided by his audience. The forms of narrative con-
nect to ideology, but the connection is in the complex way expressed by the distinction
between narrative invited [Scalia] and narrative told [Marshall]. When Scalia offers the
abstract principle of symmetry, the white reader will have little difficulty providing narra-
tives and imaginings that permit him to reject affirmative action. The rejection only ap-
pears to occur at a formal level on the field of the cool syllogism; it goes on in the hot and
vivid world of the imagining reader.
Ross, supra note 92, at 408.
101. Bork contends that judges committed to the judicial philosophy of original understanding
should pay "particular respect... to precedents set by courts within a few decades of a provision's
ratification since the judges of that time presumably had a superior knowledge of the original mean-
ing of the Constitution" (p. 157).
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sions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over
him. It is true that only the fifteenth amendment, in terms, mentions
the negro by speaking of his color and his slavery. But it is just as true
that each of the other articles was addressed to the grievances of that
race, and designed to remedy them as the fifteenth. 1° 2
Given what I have characterized as the central meaning of the four-
teenth amendment, there should be a rebuttable presumption in favor of
legislation and judicial decrees designed to remedy the disparities of
wealth, power, and status between white Americans and African Ameri-
cans. This presumption should hold even when such actions temporarily
subordinate other fourteenth amendment narratives, for instance by ad-
versely affecting members of the dominant group through race-specific
legislation, constraining the police powers of the state or requiring persis-
tent federal intervention in ways that the fourteenth amendment's con-
cern for federalism might resist.
Under the approach outlined above, benign classifications and quo-
tas intended to promote black equality, to redress a pervasive societal
discrimination against and oppression of African Americans, and to
move America closer toward the aspiration of a truly color-blind society
may be fully consistent with dimensions of the interpretivist's and
noninterpretivist's search for meaning. My hope is that students and
scholars of constitutional theory and jurisprudence will resist the tempta-
tion presented by Bork's rendition of a paradise lost and direct their at-
tention toward developing this integrative jurisprudence in far more
detail than is possible given the limited purposes of my Essay.
102. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71-72 (1872).
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